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The next meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) is at the end of November. Convened annually since 1995, under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), it monitors results and approves globally binding climate action. The guiding principle is of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, recognising that differing fiscal capacity merits differentiated responsibility. Developed economies must (a) vacate sufficient space in the global carbon envelope to create room for developing economies; (b) subsidise green technology to contain the increase in carbon emissions as developing economies grow and (c) provide finance for abating climate change impact. Science informs that an increase in global mean surface temperature (both sea and land) of more than one per cent over pre-industrial (1850 to 1900) levels could trigger irreversible climate change, folksily dubbed the “tipping point”. This year the global mean temperature was 1.55 degrees above pre-industrial levels. Climate science sceptics, including US President Donald Trump, question the tipping point theory, sadly, without providing an alternative explanation for the increase in climate impacts. This is cold comfort for the 1.2 billion people (about 14 per cent of the global population), who are most impacted by climate induced stress -- in underdeveloped countries and low-lying areas and islands. Who is responsible for the inaction? The concept of “historical responsibility” is a moral obligation based on share in cumulative historical emissions because carbon emissions are long lasting and do not dissipate. The share in global population is an apt metric for defining the upper limit of share in historical emissions, not least because emissions relate to human (anthropogenic) needs. The world has not been hopelessly profligate. The global annual growth rate of carbon emissions reduced by 22 per cent from 3.5 per cent per year to 2.2 per cent between 1950-1990 and 1990-2023- The US reduced emissions by 33 per cent, Canada by 35 per cent, EU (27 countries) by 46 per cent and the rest of Europe by 54 per cent. The share of these areas in cumulative emissions reduced from 92 per cent in 1950 to 56 per cent in 2023 but remains higher than their share in global population of about 19 per cent. Conversely, in Asia, the global share in carbon emissions increased from five per cent in 1950 to 33 per cent in 2023, still well behind its 59 per cent share in population. The share of the rest of the world in carbon emissions increased slower, from three per cent in 1950 to 11 per cent in 2023, well behind its share in population of 19 per cent. Annual growth in carbon emissions reduced by 51 per cent from 5.7 per cent per year during 1950 to 1990 to 3.4 per cent during 1990-2023. Sadly, much of this is because of low economic growth in green technology deprived economies and not quite a progressive outcome. Folks in Africa can legitimately finger rapidly growing Asia and query whether the pace of reduction in carbon emissions is adequate. Counter-factually, there are green shoots of success. Asia is greening its economy by scrounging for resources at per capita income levels far lower than either the US or Europe. China is best off, close to high per capita income levels. Its share in global carbon emissions increased from five per cent in 1990 to 15 per cent by 2023 -- three times increase but still below its population share of 17 per cent with a trend of emissions growth decreasing by 25 per cent from 7.7 per cent per year during 1950-90 to 5.4 per cent during 1990-2023. Upper middle-income India’s per capita income is less than one fifth of China’s. Its share in global carbon emissions increased from one per cent in 1990 to three per cent by 2023 -- still well below its share in population of about 17 per cent. The trend rate of emissions is increasing by 25 per cent from 4.4 per cent per year during 1950-1990 to 5.4 per cent during 1990-2023. This aligns with the conundrum that an inverse relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions kicks in, only once economies can afford to invest in efficiency enhancing green technologies. Is the 22-member Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec), an oil producers lobby, blocking green technology from maturing? Yes, but it does so legitimately, by keeping the oil price affordable, thereby decreasing the incentive for change. The US, which produces one half as much oil as Opec, along with significant amounts of shale gas, remains outside but collaborates with Opec. The US is indifferently committed to the green agenda and impatient with glacial global climate negotiations. More importantly, opting for the fiscal and strategic loss of sovereign fossil fuel resources versus the less tangible fiscal benefits of patenting affordable green technology -- the key for scaling up climate action -- is a non-trivial exercise. Free access to tightly controlled new minerals and...