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The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) presents this corruption and corruption-related investigation report on contractual arrangements involving Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), and Strategic Mobilisation Ghana Limited (SML). This report is founded on sections 2 and 3 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959) and regulation 31(1)(g) of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (Operations) Regulations, 2018 (L.I. 2374) – which mandate the OSP to investigate and prosecute allegations of corruption and corruption-related offences involving public officers, politically exposed persons and persons in the private sector under any relevant law; to recover and manage assets; and to publish detected acts of corruption as a measure to prevent corruption. Ministry of Finance (MoF) MoF is one of the central management agencies of the public services of the Republic of Ghana. It is mandated to ensure effective and efficient macroeconomic and financial management of Ghana’s economy. It is headed by the Minister of Finance. Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) GRA is a statutory authority with the responsibility of tax and customs administration of Ghana. It is headed by the Commissioner-General. Strategic Mobilisation Ghana Limited (SML) SML is a private company limited by shares and incorporated in Ghana. It was originally incorporated on 14 February 2017 as Strategic Mobilisation Enhancement Limited (SMEL). Its stated principal activities are general trading and services and import and export of general goods. Its directors are Evans Adusei, Margaret Adusei, Esther Adusei, and Patrick Adusei. Its controlling mind and owner is Evans Adusei. By a special resolution and with the approval of the Registrar of Companies, the company’s name was changed to Strategic Mobilisation Ghana Limited on 22 November 2017. The directorship, beneficial ownership, and company structure remained the same after the change of name. The Complaint In a written complaint dated 18 December 2023 and addressed to the Special Prosecutor by Evans Aziamor-Mensah, Adwoa Adobea-Owusu, and Manasseh Azure Awuni – journalists with The Fourth Estate, a non-profit investigative journalism project of Media Foundation for West Africa, the complainants petitioned the OSP to investigate contracts between MoF, GRA, and SML for possible corruption and a breach of the Public Procurement Act. The complainants alleged that Ghana stood to lose One Hundred Million United States Dollars (US$100,000,000.00) yearly if the contractual arrangements involving MoF, GRA, and SML are not abrogated. The complainants based their assertion in the context of their investigation which they commenced in December 2022 on the back of reports that suggested that Ghana was losing hundreds of millions of Cedis in revenue through lapses in the downstream petroleum sector. The complainants stated that their investigation revealed that though there existed adequate measures instituted by National Petroleum Authority (NPA) and GRA to prevent loss of revenue in the downstream petroleum sector, MoF and GRA had contracted SML to undertake a parallel and an altogether unnecessary exercise in the sector in the guise of revenue assurance steeped in fantastic claims by SML of its value addition, which turned out to be false. In the reckoning of the complainants, GRA did not employ the purported input of SML for revenue collection. The complainants maintained that notwithstanding the non-value addition of revenue generation by SML in the downstream petroleum sector, MoF and GRA had proceeded, based on false claims, to expand the scope of SML’s contracts to include revenue assurance in the upstream petroleum and minerals sectors. The complainants further maintained that the contractual arrangements involving MoF, GRA, and SML stand to corruptly strip Ghana of One Hundred Million United States Dollars (US$100,000,000.00) yearly for five years with a further renewal option of another five years. The complaint was based on an audio-visual investigative journalism piece, which was widely broadcast in the media. OSP Preliminary Investigation The Special Prosecutor, upon determining that the complaint was within the mandate of the OSP, promptly authorised relevant officials of the OSP to commence preliminary investigation into the matter in accordance with regulation 5(1)(b) of L.I. 2374. The preliminary investigation was conducted with as little intrusion into the privacy of individuals and the business operations of corporate entities as the circumstances permitted. Presidential Intervention Following extensive media coverage on what had become known as the SML scandal, the President of the Republic, by a letter dated 29 December 2023, appointed KPMG Ghana (KPMG) – an audit, tax and advisory services firm – to audit, within two weeks, “the transaction” between GRA and SML. The President stated the following as KPMG’s terms of reference: Conduct an audit to ascertain the rationale or needs assessment performed prior to the contract approval by GRA; and assess how the arrangement aligns with specific needs;Assess the appropriateness of the contracting methodology, verifying compliance with legal standards and industry best practices in the procurement process for the selection of SML;Evaluate the degree of alignment between current activities and the stipulated contract scope, identifying any deviations;Evaluate the value or benefit that SML has so far offered to GRA through this engagement;Review the financial arrangements, including pricing structures, payment terms and the resolution of any financial compliance issues; and Submit a report on your findings on the above, together with appropriate recommendations. On 2nd January 2024, the Director of Communications at the Jubilee House released a press statement informing the public of the KPMG appointment; and also that the President had directed the suspension of the performance of the SML contracts pending the submission by KPMG of the audit report. By a letter dated 2 January 2024, the Chief of Staff at the Presidency transmitted the President’s directive of the suspension of the performance of the SML contracts to the Commissioner-General of GRA. KPMG Report KPMG submitted its audit report to the President on 27 March 2024, with the following key findings: There was no specifically commissioned and purposed needs assessment report, except standalone industry analysis and reports which were issued post the contracting of SML. SML was initially contracted by GRA without the required approval of the Public Procurement Authority (PPA). There was no evidence of the required Parliamentary Approval for the award of multi-year contracts to SML. There was no evidence that the 2018 and 2019 contracts awarded to SML were effected with the required consideration and approval by the GRA Board. GRA did not institute monitoring and evaluation processes to assess the performance of SML in respect of transaction audit services. SML delivered partially on the transaction audit services and GRA may not have obtained all the expected benefits from the service. SML delivered partially on the external price verification services and GRA may not have obtained all the expected benefits from the service. In respect of measurement audit for downstream petroleum, there was reported incremental volume that is attributable to the involvement of SML determined at 1.70 billion litres for the period, which translates to incremental revenue of GHC2.45 billion attributable to the involvement of SML. In respect of upstream petroleum audit, SML was yet to deploy and implement its system to commence operations at the time of the KPMG review; and that activities toward implementation have been halted following the President’s directive to suspend the performance of the contract. SML was yet to commence measurement audit of the minerals sector at the time of the KPMG review. On the back of their key findings, KPMG offered the following relevant resolution options by way of recommendations: The Consolidated Assurance Revenue Services contract signed in October 2023 present complexities, including legal and cost value concerns that need to be resolved. If the contract is terminated it could trigger specific financial obligations on the Government of Ghana (GoG) and GRA as follows: liability to settle SML for services rendered but not yet paid; GoG and GRA are not entitled to a refund of any compensation already paid to SML, regardless of the termination clause; and if the contract is terminated without cause, GoG and GRA become liable to pay SML an equivalent of the fair value of SML’s investment in the contract; If the contract is terminated, the investment claimed to have been made by SML should be validated as SML did not provide supporting documentation on its investment in the contract. KPMG appeared to favour orderly resolution – based on systematic impact, cost to state, sustainability, complexity and deliverability, and public trust and implications – as follows: In respect of upstream petroleum and minerals audit –parliamentary approval should be sought to regularise the contract; the contract should be subjected to a technical needs and value-for-money assessment to ensure that the services are justified and the fees are proportionate to and commensurate with the services rendered; and MoF, GRA, and SML should conduct extensive engagement with relevant stakeholders to ensure awareness creation, and stakeholder buy-in and alignment. In respect of transaction audit and external price verification – these services, partially delivered, require comprehensive review to assess their ongoing relevance, especially viewed in light of the implementation of the Integrated Customs Management System (ICUMS), which has portended a duplication of external price databases and research services provided by SML. Utilising ICUMS capabilities for external price verification, the services provided by SML should be reassessed to optimise efficiency and adapt to evolving business dynamics. In respect of downstream petroleum audit – based on the reckoning that SML has gained over four(4) years’ experience and has become more proficient, the contract price should be renegotiated, including the consideration of shifting from a variable to a fixed fee structure. Consideration should be given to incorporating periodic monitoring and evaluation at least every two years to formally assess the performance of the components of the contract and related key performance indicators. OSP Full Investigation Upon the conclusion of preliminary investigation, and upon the reckoning that the facts and circumstances of the case reasonably indicated that an investigation may be conducted to prevent or prosecute corruption or a corruption-related offence, especially in light of the KPMG report which the OSP incorporated into its preliminary investigation, the Special Prosecutor, in pursuance of regulations 5(1)(c) and 6(1) of L.I. 2374, assigned the case to authorised officers of the OSP for a full investigation. Our review of the KPMG report firmed up our opening of a full investigation on three main grounds. First, the major factual findings in the KPMG report tallied with our preliminary findings. Second, the KPMG report, much like our preliminary investigation, turned up more critical questions than answers, which required further investigation. Third, the KPMG audit work and outcome differed significantly from the OSP investigation and likely outcome. While KPMG rightly identified the overall objective of its assignment as reviewing the work and activities of SML in relation to the contracts with the State and assessing the propriety of procurement and contracting processes as well as the appropriateness of cost value analysis in the performance of the contracts, the OSP’s work in this case is a criminal corruption and corruption- related investigation, of not just assessing the propriety and appropriateness of acts and activities in the context of the SML contracts but also examining the criminal culpability or otherwise of implicated persons – which is wider in scope and outlook than the audit work of KPMG. Then again, while the OSP’s preliminary findings accorded with the major factual findings in the KPMG report, the OSP found itself unable to agree with some major conclusions drawn by KPMG, especially in respect of accountability and value-for-money. The OSP investigation was concluded on 3 October 2025, after extensive surveillance, comprehensive review and analysis of hundreds of relevant and related documents at MoF, GRA, and PPA; and digital and electronic review and analysis and of thousands of relevant and related documents and computer servers and hard-drive components retrieved from two premises of SML at Osu in Accra and in Tema, and assets of SML at relevant depots; and the discovery and validation of electronic communication among the persons of interest. The OSP conducted comprehensive interviews of thirty-one persons of interest in respect of the investigation. The identities of the interviewees are disclosed where necessary. The OSP collaborated with several public institutions including Ministry of Finance, Ghana Revenue Authority, National Security Secretariat, Ghana Police Service, National Intelligence Bureau, National Signals Bureau, Financial Intelligence Centre, National Petroleum Authority, Petroleum Commission, Public Procurement Authority, and Office of the Registrar of Companies. The OSP also collaborated with several financial institutions. In augmentation of the expertise and skill of the authorised officers of the OSP, the Office also relied on expert opinion of persons in the revenue assurance set- up in transaction audit, external price verification, measurement audit of downstream petroleum, upstream petroleum audit, and measurement audit in the minerals sector. KPMG officers also assisted the OSP in the verification of KPMG’s analysis and conclusions. The OSP investigation establishes that: There was no genuine need for contracting SML for the obligations it purported to perform and that the contracts were secured for SML through self-serving official patronage, sponsorship and promotion based on false and unverified claims. The SML contracts were attended by egregious statutory breaches as mandatory prior approvals were wantonly disregarded by relevant officials who acted with increased emboldened impunity. There was no established financial management system of monitoring and verification to ensure that the Republic was obtaining the value for the money it was paying to SML and that the payment channels of payments to SML were set on automatic mode detached from actual performance, causing financial loss to the Republic. The investigation outcomes are based on the following events and analysis: The Genesis On 27 January 2017, Kenneth Nana Yaw Ofori-Atta assumed office as the Minister of Finance of Ghana. He would serve in this position till 14 February 2024. Barely three weeks after Mr. Ofori-Atta’s assumption of office, SMEL was incorporated on 14 February 2017 by a timber merchant, Evans Adusei, with the company’s stated principal activities as general trading and services and import and export of general goods. A little over four months after its incorporation, the Commissioner-General of GRA, Emmanuel Kofi Nti presented SMEL (a company he had barely heard of), to PPA seeking approval to sole-source SMEL as a service provider for enhanced classification, valuation, and risk management platform in the customs set-up. These events – the assumption of office by Mr. Ofori-Atta, the incorporation of SMEL by Mr. Adusei, and the application for sole-sourcing of SMEL by Mr. Nti – seemed unrelated at first glance. However, a closer look at subsequent events from June 2017 to 14 February 2024, when Mr. Ofori-Atta’s tenure ended, show a tightly-knit and non-coincidental association of the prior identified events as the precursors of a masterful and mischievously crafted scheme designed by Mr. Ofori-Atta, immediately upon assumption of office and throughout his tenure, as the chief promoter, patron, and sponsor of the company and the previously unseen power that unlawfully force-fed the company into the revenue assurance drive of GRA through a series of reckless decision-making and management and flagrant violation of statute though the use of public office for profit contrary to section 179C of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29), and by directly and indirectly influencing the procurement process to obtain an unfair advantage in the award of procurement contracts to the company contrary to section 92(2)(b) of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663), with the pliant and avaricious unquestioning compliance of two successive GRA Commissioner-Generals, who he kept at his slavish subservience – leading to colossal financial loss to the Republic. By December 2024, SML had been paid a total amount of One Billion Four Hundred and Thirty-Six Million Two Hundred and Forty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-Eight Cedis Fifty-Three Pesewas (GH₵1,436,249,828.53). The OSP investigation also show that the company was incorporated for the sole purpose of employing it as a vehicle to ride on official patronage and sponsorship erected on false and contrived acclaim and attributes for the award of public procurement contracts in the revenue assurance set-up. The SMEL Period First Application by GRA to PPA By a letter dated 16 June 2017, Mr. Nti (then as acting Commissioner-General of GRA) requested PPA for approval to engage SMEL through single source procurement under section 40(a)&(b) of Act 663 for enhanced classification, valuation and risk management in the context of the payment of duties and levies on imported goods. The request stated that there were incidents of same goods given different classification and duties which were giving rise to challenges and undue delays at the ports of clearance; and that SMEL would address these challenges faced by GRA to “allow for full, smoother, and better services in the Customs processes and procedures.” The request touted SMEL as having particular interest in providing effective and measurable solutions for the enhancement of government revenue; and that SMEL also enjoyed financial and technological backing from its investors – one of which was COTECNA S.A., described as a multinational company well versed in the business of inspection, testing, certification and the provision of tailor-made information technology solutions. The request further stated that though COTECNA S.A. had given SMEL the right of ownership, COTECNA S.A would provide, implement and maintain a comprehensive information technology platform that includes its proprietary systems for classification and valuation (Value Quest) and Executive Reporting System (ERS); and that these solutions would ensure full integration with the systems in the customs chain at the time to further enhance the purpose of the exchange of information between the systems. The request was most irregular and perplexing. It was simply unfathomable that a company which commenced business on 14 February 2017 would have attained the experience and track-record that was advertised in the request dated 16 June 2017 for the nature of the proposed assignment. SMEL did not possess the experience and know-how to engage in revenue assurance services on behalf of the Republic. And this obvious incredulity, which must have been prevailing on the mind of Mr. Nti, triggered an internal conflict in the request, as Mr. Nti then promptly referred to the financial and technological backing of the supposed investors of SMEL. And from then on, the 16 June 2017 letter no longer sounded as a request to sole-source SMEL but a pseudo-request to sole- source COTECNA S.A., a supposed investor of SMEL. The copious reference to COTECNA S.A. and its notable technological acclaim was merely a ruse to divert attention from the glaring incapacity of SMEL in an attempt to directly influence the procurement process to obtain an unfair advantage for SMEL, notwithstanding its lack of experience and technological capability. Indeed, GRA failed to submit any evidence of a partnership or investor agreement between SMEL and COTECNA S.A. The request merely attached the profiles of the two entities and a letter of intent from COTECNA S.A. Further, nothing in section 40 of Act 663, which governs single-source procurement, operated in favour of the attempt to sole-source SMEL to engage in revenue assurance on behalf of the Republic. It came as no surprise then that by a letter dated 4 July 2017, PPA communicated its disapproval of the 16 June 2017 request by GRA. PPA was emphatic that SMEL had no proven experience in the business it sought to undertake. Further, PPA stated that the letter of intent by COTECNA S.A. did not establish any legally binding relationship between SMEL and COTECNA for the provision of the service; and that the company seeking to be considered for a contract must demonstrate an appreciable capacity and strength of its own and possibly sub-contract a portion to a qualified sub-contractor or agent, which was absent in the instant case. Second Application by GRA to PPA Then followed a second stranger and more perplexing request by Mr. Nti (still as Acting Commissioner-General of GRA) to PPA by a letter dated 1 August 2017 by which GRA applied for approval to sole-source SMEL and Ghana Link. The request recited that SMEL had a acquired a software for the classification, valuation and risk management (CVRM) platform from COTECNA S.A., and that SML had agreed to enter into a partnership with Ghana Link, a renowned local inspection and verification service provider, to provide the necessary support services for the implementation of the platform for GRA. The request further stated that in the partnership agreement, SMEL would provide the CVRM platform while Ghana Link would provide external verification services using an appropriate platform; and that Ghana Link would also provide monitoring and supervision of customs valuation to ensure that the appropriate values are applied. The tone and tenure of the content of his own application should have portended pause and reflection on the part of Mr. Nti. In effect, he was stating that SMEL did not possess the requisite expertise and track record and no appreciable capacity and strength of its own, yet he was actively urging SMEL on PPA for approval merely six weeks after the PPA disapproval on this same ground. This was not reasonable persistence. It was a deliberate attempt to manipulate the procurement process, introduce a redundant private actor, and distort the facts and create a backdoor entry for SMEL into Ghana’s revenue assurance architecture. This time, PPA did not even bother to respond, as the circumstances surrounding SMEL’s lack of capacity and track record had not changed from the time of the rejection of the first application. Even more troubling was the fact that these CVRMs were being carried out by Customs officers through the National Single Window platform. Repetition of Second Application by GRA to PPA Seeing that PPA had not responded to the second GRA application six weeks after the request was transmitted, and the powerful behind-the-curtain chief promoter, patron and sponsor of SMEL was insistent on pushing the company into the revenue assurance space through him, Mr. Nti repeated the second application by GRA to PPA for the sole-sourcing of SML and Ghana Link by a letter dated 14 September 2017 – which was almost word for word with the 1 August 2017 request. PPA responded by a letter dated 29 September 2017 and rejected the second repeated GRA request. PPA forcefully stated that SMEL had still not shown any proven capacity in terms of experience and provision of similar assignments intended to be undertaken under the proposed joint venture agreement with Ghana Link. PPA also noted that the relationship between SMEL and Ghana Link did not provide the needed joint capacity to undertake the assignment since SMEL would not be responsible for the bulk of the assignment by GRA’s requirements. PPA signed off by stating that the re-application by GRA did not address SMEL’s lack of capacity in respect of the assignment. PPA did right on all accounts, up to this point. And with this, for SMEL was blocked from the revenue assurance drive of GRA, or so it seemed. Following these setbacks, a simple but clever second plan was implemented to ensure that the company would certainly be awarded public procurement contracts for revenue assurance, come what may. On 22 November 2017, Strategic Mobilisation Enhancement Limited (SMEL) changed its name to Strategic Mobilisation Ghana Limited (SML). Only the name changed. Everything else remained the same – including personnel and lack of expertise and capability. By a letter dated 30 November 2017, Mr. Adusei informed GRA of the name change, while reserving the binding and full effect of all prior transactions. Seven months after the name change, GRA and MoF commenced the unlawful award to SML of a string of specialised revenue assurance public procurement contracts running into late 2023 – in respect of transaction audit and external price verification, downstream petroluem, upstream petroleum, and the minerals sector. Transaction audit involves post-clearance review of import and export declarations to ensure accurate classification, valuation, and risk assessment under the Customs Act, 2015 (Act 891). It scrutinises Customs Classification and Valuation Reports (CCVRs) generated at the ports, and the verification of compliance with international standards like the World Customs Organisation's Harmonised System, and the Valuation Agreement of the World Trade Organisation. The object is to detect under-valuation, misclassification, and evasion, which erode tax revenues. External price verification complements this by providing independent third- party checks on the authenticity of supporting documents such as invoices, bills of lading, and certificates of origin – often employing digital tools for real-time data cross-matching. The downstream petroleum sector encompasses the refining, distribution, storage, and retail of petroleum products, from import terminals to fuel stations. It involves the activities of bulk oil distributors, depot operators, and marketers handling products like gasoline, diesel, and liquefied petroleum gas. Revenue assurance in this context focuses on metering liftings from depots like Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) to prevent under-reporting. The upstream petroleum sector involves exploration, drilling, and production of crude oil and natural gas, primarily offshore in the Jubilee, Tweneboa Enyenra Ntomme, and Sankofa Gye-Nyame major oil fields operated by companies like Tullow Oil and Kosmos Energy. Revenue assurance entails metering crude volumes on Floating Production, Storage, and Offloading (FPSO) vessels and verifying production data to curb misreporting. The minerals sector covers the extraction, processing, and export of all identifiable minerals occurring naturally on or in the land and in water, whether solid or in liquid form (excluding petroleum) and also those forged by means of industrial processes. Revenue assurance here involves the measurement of mined minerals. Contract for Transaction Audit Services After the change of name of the company from SMEL to SML, the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of the company were actively looking for an opportunity to re-introduce the re-christened company back into their design of awarding it public procurement contracts for revenue assurance notwithstanding its lack of experience and capacity. The opportunity presented itself in a most unusual way through the enforced wrestling of a public procurement contract from a company named West Blue Ghana Limited (West Blue) through official accretional duress and browbeating. West Blue was incorporated in Ghana on 3 July 2012. It commenced business on 6 July 2012. Its core mandate, as stated in its objects, is to facilitate trade, reform, and modernisation programmes, with a particular focus on ICT implementation and management consultancy. By a contract dated 4 August 2015, GoG (acting through MoF and GRA) contracted West Blue for the provision of National Single Window Integrated Risk Management (NSWIRM), which entailed the delivery, installation, and maintenance of the NSWIRM to enable GRA undertake core classification, valuation and risk management functions of the Destination Inspection Companies (which were exiting the sector on 1 September 2015); and the provision of support services including error correction and hotfixes. The contract was billed for an initial five-year period, subject to earlier termination by either party. Through the 4 August 2015 contract, West Blue became central to Ghana’s trade facilitation and customs automation reforms until the contract’s termination at the end of 2018, after which it became involved in legal disputes over outstanding payments and retained equipment. Unbeknownst to West Blue, the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML were eyeing its contract and devising means to dislodge it from the revenue assurance space and hand it over to SML. And by a letter dated 21 September 2017 authored by a company named Ports and Customs World Ghana Limited addressed to the Minister of Finance, the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons saw an opening – and they promptly took it. By the 21 September 2017 letter, Ports and Customs World Ghana Limited informed MoF that it was to purchase and take over shares in West Blue, and that it was committed to re-negotiating the terms of the West Blue contract dated 4 August 2015 with a more competitive price and improved technology. Citing a value-for-money audit by Crown Agents Ghana Limited on the West Blue contract, which recommended the option of a re-negotiation of the contract to give GoG better value for money, MoF responded to Ports and Customs World Ghana Limited with deadly effect by a letter dated 25 January 2018. MoF stated that it would terminate the West Blue contract on 31 December 2018. However, before the indicated termination date, it would reduce the contract price of 0.35% to 0.28% of the final invoice of cost, insurance, freight (CIF) value of import consignments handled by West Blue. How a cited recommended option of a re-negotiation of the contract was drastically elevated to termination of the contract, can only be explained by one hypothesis – that the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML were setting the tone for the unlawful substitution of West Blue with SML, without the required statutory prior approvals; and also that the reduction of the contract price payable to West Blue was not a cost saving measure in the least but a design with the sole purpose of withering down and stifling West Blue to hand over the contract to SML. The public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML knew they could not simply replace West Blue with SML before the indicated termination date of 31 December 2018 of the West Blue contract because of contractual obligations; and more pressing was the reckoning that SML’s involvement would trigger the requirement of mandatory prior statutory approvals. Indeed, the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML dared not return to PPA at the time with a request for approval of SML’s involvement, since the only thing that had changed about the company, since the 29 September 2017 rejection by PPA, was the company’s name. Therefore, the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML decided to place SML on the lap of West Blue and did in fact force SML on West Blue as its supposed subcontractor on the West Blue contract, without the mandatory prior statutory approvals. Thus, the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML commenced participation in a series of outright criminal conduct by knowingly disregarding and breaching criminal prohibitions backed by a sense of impunity as they viewed themselves as all too powerful. By a contract dated 1 June 2018 – entitled Transaction Audit Services Agreement – and with the parties as GRA, West Blue, and SML, the company, which was rightfully characterised by PPA as having no proven capacity in terms of experience and provision of similar assignments in the sector, was introduced as the supposed subcontractor of West Blue. The recitals of the contract stated that SML desired to perform and West Blue desired to have SML perform transaction audit services for and on behalf of West Blue in respect of the latter’s contract for the implementation of the National Single Window Project; and that GRA had agreed to pay for the services of the SML. The 1 June 2018 agreement was certainly not a result of West Blue’s initiative; and its conduct after the execution of the contract showed that it did not welcome SML as its supposed subcontractor. It was openly opposed to SML acting as its supposed subcontractor. Indeed, this was not a case of one private entity subcontracting another private entity to carry out specialised services for it in respect of a public procurement contract. This was a forceful peel-away of West Blue’s mandate under the 4 August 2015 contract and an unlawful donation of the cut-out mandate to SML by the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML. Under the 1 June 2018 agreement, West Blue was not the client of SML. GRA was described as the client; and the obligation to pay SML fell directly on GRA. SML’s invoices for payment were to be submitted not through West Blue but directly to GRA. The only contractual obligation placed on GRA was that it should pay SML’s fees directly to SML. West Blue had no compensation obligation toward SML. Indeed, to all practical and legal purposes, SML was not performing any services for West Blue. SML’s purported services were directly for GRA and not indirectly through West Blue. The specific contractual involvement of GRA in this at once clever and not-so- clever arrangement rendered it a sole-sourced public procurement contract, which required prior PPA approval. However, PPA’s prior approval was neither sought for nor obtained for the 1 June 2018 contract. This unlawfulness was perpetrated with the full knowledge and involvement of the Minister of Finance. The duration of the 1 June 2018 agreement was tied with the termination date of West Blue’s mother contract. The contract required SML to provide transaction audit services of CCVRs generated and issued at the pre-arrival processing phase of the implementation of the National Single Window Project. Upon completion of the audit and the statement of its findings, SML was required to forward the transaction audit reports together with all relevant attachments to the Customs Post Clearance Audit (PCA) officer through data exchange protocols agreed with West Blue. The Customs PCA officer was then required to review the transaction audit reports and either accept or reject them. The fee payable to SML under the contract was a transaction fee equivalent to 0.1% of the CIF value of CCVRs generated at the pre-arrival processing phase. For payment of contract fees to be effected by GRA, SML was required to submit invoices to West Blue for endorsement before SML would then submit the invoices and the transaction audit reports in reference to GRA for payment. The contract also stipulated that where SML was unable to perform the services in whole or in part, GRA should prorate or withhold SML’s fees altogether. By way of obligations, SML was required to provide all resources, facilities, management, labour expertise, skills, tools and equipment necessary for the performance of its assumed services. On the other hand, West Blue was to ensure that SML performed the services with the degree, skill and diligence normally required in the industry. Thus, in fairness, it did sound like a contractor and subcontractor relationship on paper – under which the subcontractor was expected to apply skill, expertise and tools. However, the reality was starkly different. SML did not provide any such skill, expertise and tools under the contract. It merely sat on the skill, expertise and tools of West Blue in a pretend-posturing-sham of delivering transaction audit services for the Republic. It became painfully clear a little over a month after the signing of the 1 June 2018 contract that SML had no skill, expertise and tools of its own and that West Blue had been forced into an unwanted marriage which required it to shoulder the assumed primary obligations of SML. It was as if West Blue was the subcontractor for SML as it was being required to work for SML. By mid-July 2018, the tenuous and artificial relationship between West Blue and SML was falling apart, and by November 2018 the enforced partnership had collapsed – evidenced by a series of letters and emails exchanged between the two entities. SML was perpetually vexed by West Blue’s apparent stance of ignoring the former’s repeated request for information. West Blue, on the other hand, was registering its consternation at the forced marriage by supplying little or no information to SML in a silent protest of a demonstration that SML’s participation was needless and downright otiose; and that it had no skill, expertise, and tools of its own to function. By an email dated 7 July 2018 and a follow up letter dated 9 July 2018, SML was already complaining to West Blue. By a letter dated 13 July 2018, West Blue reluctantly sent SML an Application Programming Interface (API) specification guide regarding CCVR data exchange web service. This was the nature of the enforced relationship and by a letter dated 14 September 2018, GRA stepped in and directed West Blue to transmit the top twenty revenue yielding goods to SML, with a stipulated deadline of twelve hours. By an email dated 26 November 2018, SML informed West Blue that it had not received any files from West Blue in the previous four days; and that only four files, out of the expected twenty files, had been received per day on 14, 20, and 21 November 2018. And by the first week of December 2018, SML had come to the grim realisation that West Blue had no intention of transmitting any information to it and whatever work SML was purporting to perform under the contract had ceased since 22 November 2018. Therefore, by a letter dated 6 December 2018 – titled Cessation of Files Receipt from West Blue – SML frankly acknowledged its incapacity to West Blue that it depended on West Blue for its output to GRA. In effect, without West Blue, SML could not purport to be performing any service. Though West Blue later cited technical challenges as the cause of the paucity of transmission of information to SML in the last quarter of 2018 by a letter dated 15 January 2019 addressed to GRA, it had ably demonstrated (from its standpoint), by the close of 2018, which was the termination date of the transaction audit services agreement involving SML as supposed subcontractor, what had been obvious from the inception of that contract that SML was not a subcontractor for West Blue, that the inclusion of SML in the National Single Window Project was needless, and that SML had no demonstrable and appreciable capacity, skill, expertise, and strength of its own to participate in the sector. These events forcefully establish that the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML compelled West Blue to take on SML as a purported subcontractor, notwithstanding repeated rejections by PPA for lack of capacity coupled with the absence of demonstrated operational need. The recurring unhappy friction between West Blue and SML underscores the fact the former neither sought for nor welcomed the latter’s involvement in its contractual dealings with the Republic; and that SML’s entry unnecessarily disrupted the system of transaction audit and created an added layer of wasteful inefficiency in the sector. On 31 December 2018, the 4 August 2015 West Blue contract for the provision of a National Single Window Integrated Risk Management for the classification, valuation and risk management in respect of imported goods, terminated. On the same day, the 1 June 2018 transaction audit services agreement, involving SML as supposed contractor to West Blue under the latter’s 4 August 2015, also terminated. Upon the termination of the mother contract and its offshoot so-called subcontract on 31 December 2018, any reasonable person would have thought that if the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML were not criminally minded and were not engaged in criminality and were not intending to engage further in criminality, they would have naturally rolled out SML from the GRA revenue assurance drive and properly and lawfully given it an above- the-table chance in competition with like-minded entities. However, intending to further perpetrate criminality and to profit from same, they purported to extend SML’s engagement, without the subsistence of the mother West Blue contract. Later, they then purported to unlawfully include West Blue in the extended service when they faced the formidable challenge of the obvious – that SML could not operate without the expertise of West Blue and that SML’s participation could only be justified by them if that participation rode on the back of West Blue. Extension of Contract for Transaction Audit Services The events commencing from 1 January 2019 were most troubling – as the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML doubled down on their criminal conduct with an enhanced sense of impunity. By a contract titled Contract Extension and dated 1 January 2019 and signed between GRA and SML, the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML purported to extend the 1 June 2018 contract involving GRA, West Blue, and SML for a month with the same terms and conditions in favour of SML and a provision for monthly renewal unless terminated by GRA. By this time, Mr. Nti had been confirmed as the substantive Commissioner-General of GRA. The striking feature of the contract extension was that it was executed without a corresponding renewal of West Blue’s mother contract upon which the 1 June 2018 contract sat and upon which the 1 January 2019 contract extension should have sat. The effect was that the contract extension sat on nothing, factually and legally. It stood alone in abject illegality and criminality, without approval by PPA. Thus, on 1 January 2019, the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML finally reached their intended and eventual goal commenced in 2017 of their forcible entry of SML into the revenue assurance drive of GRA with the successful dislodgment of West Blue and the donation of its contract to SML. Further, by not stipulating the specific duration of the contract, the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML handed the company a potentially perpetual contract and thereby sought, unsuccessfully, to avoid the statutory requirement under section 33(1) of the Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921), that provides that a covered entity (such as GRA) shall not enter into any agreement with a financial commitment that binds the Government for more than one financial year or that results in a contingent liability (as was the outlook of the contract) except where the financial commitment or the contingent liability is with the prior written approval of the Minister of Finance and authorised by Parliament in accordance with article 181 of the Constitution. No sooner had this unlawful feat been attained than critical problems commenced their attendance on the new arrangement. SML still did not possess the skill, expertise, and tools to engage in transaction audit services and it lacked a functioning system to receive and process CCVRs; and West Blue, upon whose tools and expertise SML relied to purport to perform the services, had been kicked out and was without a contract. Therefore, the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML decided on a short-lived course of bullying West Blue further into submission to hand over its work to SML. By a letter dated 10 January 2019, the Commissioner of the Customs Division of GRA, Isaac Crentsil directed West Blue to cause the transfer of the transaction audit services for the top twenty imports to SML with effect from 11 January 2019. For added measure, Mr. Crentsil threw in a threat that if West Blue failed to cause the transfer, it would not be paid its outstanding fees for December 2018 and thereafter, for any month in which it failed to comply with the directive – forgetting that West Blue had exited the service. In that same letter, Mr. Crentsil advised SML to position itself by taking the necessary steps to take over the transaction audit services for the top twenty imports from West Blue. This letter was copied to the Minister of Finance, the Commissioner-General, and the Chief Executive of SML. By a letter dated 15 January 2019, West Blue responded to the 10 January 2019 directive by pointing out the obvious – that the 1 June 2018 arrangement between GRA, West Blue, and SML expired on 31 December 2018. Nonetheless, it explained that it had been submitting the required information to SML since 1 June 2018 but that it encountered technical challenges in the last quarter of 2018. This letter was copied to the Minister of Finance, the Commissioner-General of GRA, and the Chief Executive of SML. However, on the same day, reeling under the intense bullying of the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML and faced with the open threat of the non-payment of its outstanding December 2018 fees should it fail to comply with the 10 January 2019 directive, West Blue handed over the transaction audit services for the top twenty imports between October and December 2018 to SML not through any established system but on a Universal Serial Bus (USB) drive. Upon receipt of West Blue’s 15 January 2019 response, the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML upped their unlawful conduct. By a letter dated 23 January 2019 and addressed to the Chief Executive of West Blue, Mr. Crentsil stated that though West Blue’s contract with SML had expired on 31 December 2018, he was advising West Blue to proceed under the same terms and effectively collaborate with SML until further notice. This letter was copied to the Minister of Finance, the Commissioner-General of GRA, and the Chief Executive of SML. This directive, dressed by way of an advice, blurred all good sense and the exercise of lawful authority. In effect, Mr. Crentsil, by the 23 January 2019 letter, was seeking to effectively resurrect the expired 1 June 2018 contract involving GRA, West Blue, and SML, any by necessary extension the terminated West Blue mother contract of 4 August 2015 to the benefit of the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML. Our conclusion becomes even more telling on the consideration that upon retirement as the Commissioner of the Customs Division of GRA, Mr. Crentsil took up appointment as the General Manager of SML, colouring his actions while in office as an inducement for future reward of a retirement benefit and use of public office for his private benefit. On the same 23 January 2019, SML wasted no time in formalising its new position by a letter addressed to West Blue acknowledging receipt of the USB, stating that only 9.7% of the expected files had been transmitted to it by West Blue, and effectively affirming the shift of responsibility from West Blue to SML. This letter was copied to the Minister of Finance, the Commissioner-General of GRA, and the Commissioner of the Customs Division of GRA. By a letter dated 28 January 2019, SML and addressed to the Commissioner of the Customs Division of GRA, SML accepted the offer of contract extension. It intimated that it looked forward to the updated contract extension. This letter was copied to the Minister of Finance and the Commissioner-General of GRA. Then, by a letter dated 1 February 2019 authored by Mr. Crentsil, West Blue was informed that the agreement involving GRA, West Blue, and SML had been renewed and that West Blue was requested to send files to SML through WEBService as before. This letter was transmitted without the slightest regard to the grave legal implication that it was effectively unlawfully reviving the 4 August 2015 West Blue mother contract. The transition was now complete. West Blue had been sidelined – its mother contract had been terminated; it had been coerced into an unhappy relationship with SML; that arrangement had also expired; the purported communication of extension was not worth the letter in which it was written; and its vital information had been wrestled from it and donated to SML. Consequently, by 1 February 2019, SML – which had been repeatedly rejected by PPA for lack of capacity, experience, and expertise – had been successfully seated and entrenched in the public revenue assurance space through the back door by a simple name-change and thereby bypassing and escaping scrutiny of statutory prior approvals – through the unlawful conduct of its public official promoters, sponsors and patrons. Naturally, West Blue fought back at the legal absurdity of the new arrangement. By a letter dated 14 February 2019 and addressed to the Commissioner of the Customs Division of GRA, its lawyers strongly questioned how GRA could extend or alter a contract without a formal agreement, and why West Blue, whose contract had expired, was being compelled to service a subcontractor that had no legal or operational footing. The lawyers also noted that the 1 January 2019 contract extension signed by GRA and SML excluded West Blue as a party and without according it similar treatment as SML. The lawyers also pointed out that GRA could not rely on the contract extension clause in the 1 June 2018 contract since that clause did not survive the expiration of the contract. The lawyers then advised that a new contract had to be executed with the involvement of West Blue. This letter was copied to the Minister of Finance and the Commissioner- General of GRA. Contract for Additional Services (External Verification) The public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML then proceeded to firmly entrench the company in the public revenue assurance space by once again mounting another contract upon a contract which was itself based on nothing. By a contract for additional services dated 1 April 2019 between GRA and SML – recited as made pursuant to the 1 January 2019 contract extension – GRA appointed SML to provide external verification services to Customs Technical Services Bureau (CTSB). The contract was tied to the unspecified duration of the 1 January 2019 contract extension, and with an additional fee of 0.07% of the CIF value of CCVRs it generated. This contract was reckless by all accounts as it was executed and implemented at a time when SML still did not possess the capacity, experience, and expertise to perform the services it was originally engaged to deliver. It beats the imagination then that the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML added on additional services in respect of which the company had absolutely no skill, expertise, experience, and capacity. It was a case of more money for no work and, much like the 1 January 2019 contract, the 1 April 2019 contract was bedeviled by all the unlawfulness of the absence of statutory prior approvals by PPA and Parliament. Having estimated that SML had been cleaned up enough to gain acceptance by July 2019, the chief public official promoter, sponsor and patron of SML, Mr. Ofori-Atta commenced a more direct involvement in the company’s activities and interface with public institutions to secure more public procurement contracts for the company and to ensure that its path to that attainment was well-cleared and smoothened. On the instructions of Mr. Ofori-Atta, the Technical Advisor, ICT at MoF, by an email dated 16 July 2019, invited the controlling mind of West Blue to a meeting with Mr. Ofori-Atta at the boardroom of the Minister of Finance slated for 17 July 2019. On 17 July 2019, Mr. Ofori-Atta hosted SML and West Blue in his office at the Ministry of Finance and impressed upon West Blue to transmit to SML all that was required for SML to perform its assumed obligations under the two contracts. The meeting resolved that West Blue should reactivate its webservice to SML by transmitting all CCVR data in respect of January to June 2019. Emboldened by the resolution at the 17 July 2019 meeting, SML authored a letter dated 19 July 2019 addressed to the Deputy Minister of Finance and copied to the Minister of Finance and the Commissioner-General of GRA by which it recapped the resolution and stated its mandate – upon which it required specific actions to be performed by West Blue and the CTSB. A week later, Mr. Nti, by a letter dated 26 July 2019 addressed to the Chief Executive of West Blue, requested for an urgent technical meeting to facilitate the implementation of the outcome of the 17 July 2019 meeting held in Mr. Ofori- Atta’s office. All these actions were pushed through by the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML with the full knowledge that West Blue was out of a contract. By the end of July 2019, SML had been fully and unlawfully entrenched as the revenue assurance service provider of GRA in respect of transaction audit and external price verification services of imported goods. And by a letter dated 31 July 2019, SML was now issuing seeming directives on what it required from West Blue to enable it to undertake transaction audit services in the pre-arrival environment before goods are cleared at the ports. During this period, Mr. Ofori-Atta’s increased participation in personally promoting the cause of SML had become pronounced. On 29 August 2019, he directed his technical adviser, through his Chef de Cabinet, Mr. Akore, to lead the integration of West Blue and SML alongside the new leadership of the Customs Technical Services Bureau (CTSB). By September 2019, SML’s lack of capacity, expertise, and tools had come full circle evidenced in email exchanges in late August and early September among the Technical Advisor to the Commissioner of Customs, the Head of Operations at SML, and West Blue. On one end, West Blue was still stalling and not following up fully with its promise of transferring its work to SML – if only to prove the point that SML was redundant. Indeed, at the time of the exchange of the emails, West Blue had transmitted just 166 out of an expected 3,500 CCVRs to SML. In very strong language, the Head of Operations at SML expressed the company’s frustration by stating that: “[W]e are frankly appalled at the lack of urgency that you seem to be displaying towards the Honourable Minister’s directive for the data integration and transfer.” Mr. Ofori-Atta was copied in that email chain. This is highly significant because, as Minister of Finance, he was placed in direct knowledge of SML’s operational and tool incapacity, and that it was hardly performing any service to deserve the payment of fees. Had he not been personally benefitting from SML’s unlawfully procured contracts, the open display by SML of lack of capacity, expertise, and tools would have immediately triggered his intervention to halt payments to SML and demand accountability. Instead, he looked on conspiratorially in silence while endorsing and approving payments to SML from the Consolidated Fund, Petroleum Revenue Account, and Tax Refund Account – with no technical or operational basis. Indeed, by a directive dated 12 November 2020, when SML’s circumstances remained the same, Mr. Ofori-Atta instructed the Controller and Accountant General to transfer an amount of Sixty-Five Million One Hundred and Ninety-Three Thousand Seven Hundred and One Cedis Ninety Pesewas (GH₵65,193,701.90) from the Petroleum Revenue Account to enable GRA make payments to SML for downstream petroleum audit for the months of June, July, and August 2020. By this act, Mr. Ofori-Atta threw his full ministerial weight and blessing behind a contract that had been, to his knowledge, procured unlawfully. It became a pattern that GRA would directly petition Mr. Ofori-Atta to authorise extraordinary disbursements from public accounts – the favourite being the Tax Refund Account. On another hand, the CTSB staff were unsure of SML’s involvement in the transaction audit and external price verification space. Also, they had not been briefed about the process flow of activities and the agreement between GRA and SML. The Technical Advisor to the Commissioner of Customs expressed this concern to the Head of Operations at SML in an email dated 3 September 2019 and copied to an extraordinary list of persons including Mr. Ofori-Atta and Mr. Nti. The OSP investigation shows that the troubleshooting displayed during this period was borne of the unlawful imposition of SML in the space and the still lingering reality of SML’s lack of capacity to carry out transaction audit and external price verification, after fifteen months of engagement. The company had no system in place to receive CCVRs, while West Blue was under no legal obligation to release the vital data to it. As a result, the work went undone yet SML continued to be paid. It is highly worrisome that though SML were doing practically nothing, GRA kept authorising steady payments to the company. The OSP investigation shows that the 1 June 2018 contract involving GRA, West Blue and SML; the 1 January 2019 contract extension between GRA and SML; and the 1 April 2019 contract for additional services between GRA and SML were of no real benefit to the Republic and an unnecessary drain on the public purse. Indeed, all the away into May 2021, SML was displaying its incapacity by seeking integration into the transaction audit and external price verification systems by two requests dated 12 May 2021 and 15 May 2021. On 20 September 2019, MoF, by a press release, announced that Mr. Nti would retire as the Commissioner-General of GRA, effective 1 October 2019. The release also stated that Ammishaddai Owusu-Amoah, the Commissioner for the Domestic Tax Division of GRA, would take over as the Acting Commissioner- General. This was in clear reference to a letter dated 19 May 2020 signed by the Secretary to the President, which appointed Rev. Ammishaddai Owusu-Amoah to act as the Commissioner-General of GRA effective 1 October 2019 pending the receipt of the constitutionally required advice of the Governing Board of GRA. On the other hand, by the end of September 2019, Mr. Crentsil had also been replaced by Col. Kwadwo Damoah (Rtd.) as the Commissioner of the Customs Division of GRA; and Mr. Crentsil was on his way to cash-in on his retirement package as the General Manager of SML. Curiously, Christian Tetteh Sottie, who was the Technical Adviser to Mr. Nti also followed and became a high-level employee of SML. Consolidation of Services Agreement (Transaction Audit & External Verification Services) Measurement Audit for Downstream Petroleum Products Agreement From October 2019, the public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML enhanced their unlawful conduct to a frightening degree. On 3 October 2019, GRA and SML signed a contract for the consolidation of transaction audit services and external verification services. The previous standalone contracts, which were masqueraded as piecemeal and of very short durations, were merged and enhanced with a duration of five years, with the option of renewal. SML was to be paid a lucrative monthly transaction fee of 0.17% of the CIF value of CCVRs generated at the pre-arrival processing phase. To be eligible for payment of the monthly transaction fees, SML was required to complete audit reports stating its findings and transmit same to the CTSB and PCA officers. These officers were then tasked with reviewing the SML reports with a view to either accepting or rejecting same to validate payments upon invoices raised by SML. The OSP investigation shows that SML did not submit a single invoice in respect of this contract and under its predecessor-standalone contracts. In addition, SML did not transmit the required reports to the CTSB and PCA officers. Nonetheless, GRA kept a constant stream of automatic payments to SML under this contract and under its predecessor-standalone contracts. Consequently, the unlawful strategic investiture of SML in the public revenue assurance space became a windfall of automatic payments detached from the performance of actual work and without monitoring and verification. On the same day, 3 October 2019, GRA signed another contract with SML for the measurement audit of downstream petroleum products. It was recited in this contract, by referencing the previous contracts including the one signed on that same day, that having regard to the expertise of SML in providing transaction audit services, the services being rendered by SML to GRA was being extended to operations within the downstream petroleum sector. Upon this official falsehood, SML was handed another contract to undertake a comprehensive review of workflow and operations within the downstream uploading and offloading points; develop and implement an end-to-end electronic metering management system; measure products, monitor and digitalise the entire delivery chain by deploying very accurate computerised fiscal metering system; identify quantities of petroleum products delivered to the Bulk Distribution Centre depots; and implement an Electronic Metering Management System (EMMS) dedicated solely to fiscal management aimed at loss prevention. This contract also had an initial term of five years with the option to renew; and with a monthly service fee of 1% of the CIF value of the total volume value of petroleum products for national domestic supply. SML could only earn this fee under the contract upon submission of reports and invoices. However, much like the conduct of the transaction audit and eternal verification services, GRA kept a constant stream of automatic payments to SML without reference to the performance of actual work. The OSP investigation shows that the contract for measurement audit of downstream petroleum products was an unnecessary parallel layer since this service was already being performed satisfactorily by NPA and Customs officials. Also, SML’s measuring system was unsuitable for measurements at several depots, rendering its services of no import in respect of those depots. NPA promptly anticipated the clear and present danger of duplication. Therefore, by a letter dated 10 February 2020 addressed to the Commissioner-General of GRA, the Chief Executive of NPA requested for closer collaboration between the two authorities to avoid duplication of efforts on the consideration that NPA, had over the years, instituted technological interventions in the petroleum downstream industry aimed at improving controls and curbing illicit activities in the sector; and that it planned to introduce further measures to monitor inflows and outflows of petroleum products from depots in the country. The public official promoters, sponsors and patrons of SML were certainly not interested in whatever measures the designated state regulator of the petroleum downstream industry had instituted or was about to implement for revenue purposes. For them, it had to be SML and it could only be SML. It was their easy rainmaker. The 3 October 2019 contracts both required prior approval by PPA. That mandatory statutory prior approval was absent in each regard as there was no request to PPA. In addition, the multi-year term of five years duration of the contracts which bound the Government to financial commitments for more than a year and resulted in a contingent liability also triggered section 33(1) of the Public Financial Management Act which requires the prior written approval of the Minister of Finance and authorisation by Parliament. The OSP investigation did not uncover a prior written approval by the Minister of Finance of the 3 October 2019 contracts. However, Mr. Ofori-Atta’s involvement in the procurement of the contracts by his actions showed that he firmly approved of the contracts, even if not in writing. Therefore, if the claim in his defence is that he did not write to approve the contracts and so he bears no criminal culpability, then it is the worse form of dereliction of duty as the contracts were secured under his direct watch and supervision, and he subsequently wrote to three state institutions falsely touting the unique expertise o
