By Tom Hussain

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The US-brokered ceasefire in Gaza has halted two years of bloodshed, but analysts warn it will only hold if President Donald Trump, his administration and key Middle Eastern mediators remain deeply invested in preventing the conflict from reigniting.
Neither Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu nor Hamas readily agreed to the truce. Rather, observers say they were compelled to comply by Trump and the coordinated efforts of Qatar, Egypt and Turkey.
“They are invested in the ceasefire and prisoner exchange and, for the Palestinians, an influx into Gaza of urgently needed humanitarian aid,” said Barbara Slavin, distinguished Middle East fellow of the Stimson Centre, a Washington-based think tank.
“The rest of the ‘deal’ is much more uncertain,” she told This Week In Asia.
Otherwise, Netanyahu and Hamas have not backed down from their hardened positions on the issues that will ultimately determine the final outcome of the war: Israel’s continued military occupation of much of the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ desire to keep fighting it.
“Both are engaged but hedging,” said Andreas Krieg, an associate professor of defence studies at King’s College London.

Netanyahu has embraced the White House framework because it promises a ceasefire, hostage returns and an interim authority in Gaza that keeps Hamas out, while allowing a phased Israeli military pullback and an ongoing Israeli “perimeter presence”, according to Krieg.
“That aligns with his security red lines and buys time politically, but he has repeatedly cast doubt on any path to Palestinian statehood, signalling he will shape the process, not be led by it,” Krieg told This Week In Asia.
In a televised speech made immediately after the ceasefire took effect, Netanyahu attributed Hamas’ agreement to release all remaining Israeli hostages, alive and deceased, to a combination of “heavy [Israeli] military pressure” and diplomatic pressure “from our big friend President Trump”.
Netanyahu vowed that “Hamas will be disarmed, and Gaza will be demilitarised” under subsequent phases of the Trump plan to end the war and shape its future.
“If this is achieved the easy way, great. And if not, it will be achieved the hard way,” the Israeli prime minister warned.
Likewise, Hamas’ external leadership was signalling conditional openness to a phased ceasefire–exchange package, “but it has not accepted dissolution or front-loaded disarmament,” Krieg said.
“Those remain red lines absent verified Israeli withdrawal and a real political horizon.”

Exiled Hamas chief Khalil al-Hayya had hailed guarantees from the US and Arab mediators and declared that the “war is over”, but that did not equate to agreement to disarm the movement, Krieg said.
“So both sides are moving because of American and Qatari pressure but each is still positioning to preserve core interests under the deal’s umbrella.”
Scepticism about the durability of the ceasefire is thus widespread, and many analysts expect the deal to break down and Israeli military operations to resume in Gaza.
“History suggests that will be the case,” Slavin said. “When or if that happens depends on a number of variables, including Donald Trump’s attention span and internal Israeli and Palestinian politics.”
She said the ceasefire would have a better chance of lasting longer if it “marks the beginning of the end of Bibi Netanyahu’s government”.
But that also depends on whether Hamas is willing to forgo violence and the actions of other militant groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
According to Krieg, the “stress points” in the Trump peace plan are clear: the sequencing of Israeli hostage-Palestinian prisoner swaps and Israeli troop withdrawals; who polices Gaza’s interior during the transition; and whether disarmament of Gazan militants is treated as a near-term obligation or a long-term disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process.
“The US text itself is thin on sequencing after the initial steps,” Krieg said.
It contemplates a US-anchored international body and a temporary stabilisation force while the Palestinian Authority undergoes deep reforms.

“Again, there is ample scope for friction and slippage if trust evaporates,” Krieg said.
“If those disputes spike, Israel has the capability” and, in parts of Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition government, “the appetite to resume raids or tighten the perimeter and this is why relapse is plausible.”
But given the hostage imperative, regional buy-in and Washington’s investment, “the more likely near-term pattern is lurching progress punctuated by crises rather than a wholesale collapse back to full-scale war”.
“We might see the Lebanonisation and West Bankisation of Gaza, where a ceasefire is in place but Israel strikes occasionally,” Krieg said.
Similarly, it remains unclear whether Netanyahu is prepared to embrace Trump’s characterisation of the Gaza deal as the foundation for a wider peace in the Middle East.
“Israel has always taken unilateral action against perceived threats,” Slavin observed.
“If anything, a Gaza ceasefire might free up the Israel Defence Forces [IDF] for more attacks on other targets.”
Israel has not stopped bombing Lebanon, “despite a supposed ceasefire”, and it continues to threaten to attack Iran again if Tehran tries to reconstitute its nuclear programme.
“In sum, we are talking about a ceasefire in Gaza and a prisoner exchange, but hardly an end to a more than century-old conflict,” Slavin said.

On the other hand, Krieg said a holding ceasefire in Gaza “reduces the incentive for major IDF escalations” on the northern and eastern fronts, but would not remove them.
Israel’s campaign against Iran-linked assets in Syria intensified through 2024–25 and was likely to continue as “between wars” activity, “albeit more tightly deconflicted while Gaza stabilises”, he said.
After the direct Israel–Iran exchange in June, “both sides showed they can escalate and then stop under heavy US and Gulf pressure”.
“With a Gaza process in motion, Washington will press hard against any new long-range Israeli strike into Iran unless there is a proximate threat,” Krieg said, predicting a similar logic on Lebanon.
“If Gaza calms, Jerusalem will seek to lock in reduced fire along the Blue Line and avoid moves that hand Hezbollah a pretext to reignite large-scale hostilities, while still conducting pinpoint actions against high-value targets if required.”
The upshot, he said, was “lower tempo, not zero”.
“The Gaza track won’t end Israel’s shadow war in the region, but it will push it back into a quieter, more deniable box so long as the ceasefire and hostage sequence stay on course,” Krieg said.
“Israel hasn’t found a way to solve and settle any of these crises strategically and politically.”