By Chris Blackhurst

Copyright standard

WHEN we talk about the consequences of Brexit, it helps to separate the first order from the second. The first are direct effects of legislation – rules that apply to Britain because of decisions made in Brussels. The second are the knock-on effects: changes to trade, prices, or security that hit us, even though we are now outside the EU.

Energy is a case in point.

Brexiteers like to claim that we ‘took back control’. But the truth is that Britain’s destiny is still being shaped in Brussels, only today we have no say in the decisions. The EU’s new Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive – or CSD3 – is the proof.

CSD3 will force big companies, from oil majors to commodity traders, to design their supply chains, reduce greenhouse gas emissions across the board and align their operations with Europe’s net-zero targets. Crucially, it doesn’t just apply inside the EU. Its reach extends to any business with significant revenue in Europe – from QatarEnergy to American shale producers. Europe is exporting its climate rules to the world.

This is the first order consequence: British energy giants like BP and Shell, along with foreign suppliers, must either comply or risk losing access to the European market. That means expensive compliance systems, transition plans, and climate obligations that extend across global supply chains.

But the second order effects are more troubling. QatarEnergy has already threatened to withdraw from Europe rather than face EU fines and lawsuits. If other suppliers follow suit, Europe’s hard-fought energy diversification strategy could unravel, making the bloc more dependent once again on Russian oil and gas. That would undermine the effort to cut off the petro-roubles that fuel the Kremlin’s war machine.

For the UK, this is not just about higher gas bills at home – though those will follow, since our prices are set by European supply and demand. It is also about security. If Europe is left more vulnerable to Moscow’s energy leverage, then Britain’s own strategy to tighten the screws on Putin falters too. Instead of increasing pressure, we weaken it.

As Cambridge professor Helen Thompson has argued, energy is never just an economic question – it is the foundation of geopolitical power, and states that misjudge it risk exposing their own vulnerabilities.

This is one reason Putin views the West as divided and in thrall to the ESG lobby. He understands, perhaps better than some of our own politicians, that energy policy is national security.

Washington has noticed as well. Senator Bill Hagerty introduced legislation earlier this year to prevent American firms from complying with CSD3. It is a vivid example of the EU wielding its economic power to impose progressive global standards – and the US pushing back.

Where is Britain? Squeezed between Brussels and Washington. We might, in the short term, benefit from cheaper imports if suppliers bypass the EU and sell into the UK instead. But the price will be paid elsewhere: if Europe is weakened, Britain will be forced to step up more militarily to counter the Russian threat.

That is the reality of Brexit. We traded influence in Brussels for illusions of control — and now we face a world where our energy bills rise, our security is at risk, and our soldiers may be asked to bear the burden instead.