Copyright thediplomat
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung and former Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru held their first summit meeting during the G-7 Summit in Canada in June, immediately following Lee’s inauguration. This was followed by Lee’s visit to Japan at the end of August en route to the United States, as well as another meeting in Busan at the end of September, meaning that three summit meetings were held in the span of just four months. The clutch of meetings makes clear that both Tokyo and Seoul are amply aware of the importance of Japan-South Korea relations in the current international environments. It also means that the two governments have effectively agreed on a policy of refraining from unilaterally changing the status quo on historical issues for the sake of smoothly navigating bilateral relations. Now, after a period of uncertainty following Komeito’s decision to leave Japan’s coalition government, Takaichi Sanae has finally been able to form a government, thanks to a new coalition between her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Nippon Ishin no Kai (the Japan Innovation Party). From a Korean perspective, Takaichi’s record on historical matters deviates from the line noted above, so both the Lee administration and Koreans generally are wary of her new administration. Perhaps aware of these domestic and foreign perspectives, Takaichi has tentatively announced a “realistic line,” including a halt to Yasukuni Shrine visits for the time being. Still, the outlook for Japan-South Korea relations is uncertain, at least when it comes to historical issues. In fact, the new coalition notwithstanding, the future of the Takaichi administration itself is quite unpredictable. Meanwhile, the international situation that surrounds Japan and South Korea really does not allow the two countries the luxury of ramping up conflict over historical questions. North Korea is committed to developing nuclear missiles while bolstering military cooperation with Russia, for instance by dispatching troops to the Russia-Ukraine War, as part of its survival strategy that relies on traditional friendly countries, led by China and Russia. To this end, North Korean is now an active participant in the new Cold War. As for South Korea, Pyongyang abandoned the shared goal of reunification to formalize its version of the Two Koreas policy, which frames inter-Korean relations as “hostile bilateral relations.” Further complicating the situation is the Trump administration, which has shown an active interest in negotiating with North Korea. U.S. President Donald Trump met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un three times in 2018-2019. North Korea has also seemed open to talks with the United States, albeit with the condition that denuclearization will not be on the agenda. While improving North Korea-U.S. relations is one way to limit North Korea’s military provocations and encourage denuclearization, neither Japan nor South Korea are keen to recognize North Korean possession of nuclear weapons as a fait accompli and limit talks to the ICBM issue, which is the only threat of concern to the United States. As in 2017, what absolutely must be avoided is any increase in the risk of military conflict between the United States and North Korea and security concerns being amplified. The need for Tokyo and Seoul to work together will only grow as the question becomes how to get the United States and North Korea to accept this position. Next is the escalation and structuralization of the China-U.S. conflict. Although both the U.S. and Chinese governments tend to seek compromise, an intensification of the conflict appears inevitable. Japan and South Korea share alliances and institutional values with the United States, meaning that they see relations with the U.S. as more important than those with China. Nonetheless, China looms large in economic terms, forcing Tokyo and Seoul to recognize Beijing’s role in shaping the regional order, such as its influence on North Korea. Although the strategic ambiguity approach employed during the former Moon Jae-in administration in South Korea allowed it to avoid choosing between the United States and China, this is no longer realistic. Japan and South Korea face the shared challenge of regulating the China-U.S. conflict, accepting a moderate cost in exchange for preventing it from seriously damaging their own security and economic interests. To this end, Japan and South Korea will need to work together, rather than operating separately. The Trump administration is also unpredictable, having surprised its allies Japan and South Korea with its tariff policy and other policies. Meanwhile, in connection with a series of “alliance modernization initiatives” that include expanding strategic flexibility, primarily to facilitate responses to a potential Taiwan emergency; requiring Tokyo and Seoul to pay a greater share of the costs of stationing U.S. military forces in Japan and South Korea; and demanding that they also increase their own military spending, Trump is pressing Tokyo and Seoul to take on a greater burden. This only redoubles the need for Japan and South Korea to form a united front. However, while Japan very quickly decided to compromise in response to Trump’s tariff policy, South Korea has resisted, saying that it simply cannot follow Japan’s example. At present, it appears that rather than Japan and South Korea presenting a united front, the Trump administration’s strategy of having them compete with each other in relation to the United States is working. Given their symmetry, Japan and South Korea display convergence dynamics in how they perceive and respond to the international environment, resulting in generally convergent foreign policy. Given that, Tokyo and Seoul ought to decide what to prioritize. One helpful approach would be to set aside squabbles over historical issues and other issues pertaining to identity in favor of institutionalizing a relationship in which they share concerns and jointly offer insights under a basic agreement that prioritizes issues related to national and social survival, including national security, declining birthrates, and aging populations.
