Copyright kyivpost
In March 2025, Min Aung Hlaing — the leader of Myanmar’s military junta — arrived in Russia to meet with Vladimir Putin. Once again, he voiced public support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and signed a deal for Moscow to build a nuclear power plant in Myanmar. Moscow’s partnership with Myanmar and its illegitimate government began long before this meeting. It includes the sale of Albatross drones to Myanmar and Russia’s role in the coup that brought Min Aung Hlaing’s military junta to power. In this brief overview, the Molfar Intelligence Institute explores how Moscow turned Myanmar into a loyal and convenient partner — drawing on leaked emails from an Albatross employee. Military-Trade Relations: Albatross Drones, Set-1 Radio Modems, and Myanmar Mines Russia began negotiating the sale of Albatross drones to Myanmar’s Ministry of Defense in 2020. At that time, Albatross LLC was supported by its partners — Set-1 JSC, a company producing radio modems for Albatross UAVs. Alongside the drones, Set-1 also tried to sell its own equipment to Myanmar. The documents mention a potential licensing deal that would allow Myanmar to produce Albatross drones domestically for its armed forces, as well as plans to open a school where Russian specialists would teach Myanmarese staff how to develop UAVs. The director and co-owner of Albatross LLC is Alexey Florov. The Molfar Intelligence Institute mentioned him in MII’s publications many times, particularly when highlighting how he managed to evade sanctions. More details can be found in this publication. Since September 2021, Russia has been actively seeking new clients in Myanmar, enlisting the help of the Russian Society for Friendship and Cooperation with the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. The head of this organisation met junta leader Min Aung Hlaing at least twice. One of the Vice Presidents, who also worked as an advisor to the Russian Embassy in Myanmar, was allegedly promised a share of future UAV sales to Myanmar. In the summer of 2022, Russia began working closely with Global Top Link Technologies, a Myanmar-based representative of the sanctioned Belarusian arms company Kidma Tech. The company’s head, Sein Htoo, who maintained contact with Albatross, speaks Russian and holds a PhD (a doctorate) from Moscow University. It is likely that this intermediary company was introduced to the Russians personally by Hlaing, as their interaction began just a few days after his visit to Moscow and another meeting with the leaders of the Society for Friendship and Cooperation with the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. Albatross, however, wasn’t the only company involved. In January 2021, Forbes reported that Russia had agreed to supply Myanmar’s military with Orlan-10E UAVs for reconnaissance. In May 2024, the Myanmar regime’s media reported that the director of the military procurement department had visited Russia in April 2023 and, in early May, purchased a batch of Orlan-10 UAVs and anti-drone equipment. Around the same time, Russia, China and India held joint drone training at air force bases in Myanmar. In return, Myanmar supplied the Russian army with its mines and returned previously purchased tank sights. Htoo Group of Companies + Ammertex + Set-1 Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, delegations from Myanmar travelled to Russia and vice versa. Photos of some of these meetings show that another partner of “Set-1” was Myanmar businessman U Tay Za, the owner of the Htoo Group of Companies. This sanctioned conglomerate served as an intermediary in supplying weapons used against civilians during the coup in Myanmar. Also present was the director of the Singapore-based shell company Ammertex, which helped Russia evade sanctions by shipping Set-1 products to Singapore and purchasing microchips for delivery to Russia. Neither Ammertex nor its director is currently under sanctions. Htoo Group of Companies Htoo Group of Companies is a private conglomerate with close ties to Myanmar’s military leadership. Its owner and head is influential businessman U Tay Za. The group operates across multiple sectors, including trade, banking, mining, tourism, and aviation. In 2017, the Htoo Group of Companies provided financial support to the Myanmar Armed Forces during “clearance operations” in Rakhine State, contributing to human rights abuses against the Rohingya population. The Htoo Group of Companies also served as an intermediary for supplying military equipment used against civilians protesting the February 1 coup, particularly in areas populated by ethnic minorities. It is sanctioned by the US, EU, UK, France, Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, and Monaco. The US also imposed sanctions on U Tai Za, noting his participation in Myanmar’s high-level military delegation that visited Russia in May 2021, led by General Maung Maung Kyaw, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force and father of Ivan Htet. Elena Holloway (LinkedIn, Instagram, Facebook, Pinterest) (formerly Berezhnaya and Fedorova) is from Moscow. She is married to a foreign national, has three children, and lives in Singapore, where she opened the private school Astor International School in 2018. Beyond her public activities, an Intelligence Online article from September 2023 reports that Elena also runs a Singapore-based company Ammertex Pte Ltd, which reportedly supplies Russian surveillance equipment to Singapore. These products come from companies whose clients include the FSB — suggesting Ammertex may be helping to bypass sanctions.Founded in 2009, Ammertex lists a few partners on its website, with “Set-1” noted as a partner “from the very beginning”. The company’s contact email, [email protected], is registered to Holloway. As of October 2025, the legal entity is active, although its website is currently offline. Notably, Ammertex has also recently changed its business classification twice: from “production of communication equipment” to “management consulting services” in August 2024, and to “business consulting” in March 2025. According to 52wmb (1, 2), between January and April 2022, Ammertex made nine purchases of various equipment from “RMD”, the official exporter of “Set-1” products. These purchases include television cameras, video recording equipment, devices for transmitting or receiving voice, images, or other data, including communication equipment for wired or wireless networks, microphones, remote-control equipment, and digital cameras — all labelled “not for military use”. Among Ammertex’s partners was also the Kazakh company “Too Da Group 22”, which supplied it with 1103 integrated circuits on December 29, 2022. Just two weeks earlier, the same company shipped small quantities of random consumer goods — creams, phone cases, pens, and various children’s toys, each containing only one or two items, likely to divert attention. “Too Da Group 22” was added to the EU sanctions list in June 2024 for supplying microchips from Germany to Russia to circumvent sanctions. Russia’s cooperation with Myanmar’s military Russia’s cooperation with the Myanmar military first appeared in an archive dated March 10, 2020. That day, the Myanmar company “Alliance Engineering Services Co. Ltd” sent a letter to a representative of the Russian firm JSC “Set-1”, a developer and manufacturer of specialized technical equipment, acting in the interests of Myanmar’s Defense Ministry. The letter expressed interest in “Set-1” wireless communication equipment for a new reconnaissance UAV being developed by the Myanmar Air Force. On the same day, CJSC RMD, the official exporter of Set-1 products, sent Alliance a commercial offer for the Sektor radio modem and related equipment. In their correspondence, the Myanmar side mentioned “Mr. Slava”, who had briefed them about the capabilities of “Set-1”. “Mr. Slava” refers to Slava Gontarenko / Yaroslav Mikhailovich Gontarenko, an intermediary from Russia with “experience working and living in Myanmar.” He would continue to participate in negotiations between the two sides. The letter from “Alliance” was sent by Hein “Ivan” Htet, who, according to a Reuters investigation, is the son of Maung Maung Kyaw, then commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Air Force. After the coup, he joined the military-established State Administrative Council, declared the country’s top authority. Reuters described him as a “key member of the junta,” closely connected to the coup leader Min Aung Hlaing. More about Set-1 In Myanmar-Russia relations, “Set-1” plays a key role. The company produces radio modems, including those used in the Albatros UAV. It was “Set-1” that quickly informed Albatros about a potential client. In the “Myanmar” folder of Florov’s computer dump, two documents were found, dated March 19 and 24, 2020: “Proposal for the UAV“, (i.e. the Albatros M5 unmanned aerial system), and “Thesis of Myanmar“, which provides a brief overview about LLC Albatros along with detailed information about the Albatros M5 UAV, its equipment and technical specifications. Communication with Florov from Albatros was carried out, in particular, by Alexander Dudov (1, 2, 3, 4), the head of special projects of Set-1. In April 2020, Htet “Ivan”, the son of the former commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Air Force, replied (1, 2) to Dudov and Florov, expressing interest of the Myanmar Air Force in the Set-1 radio modem and potentially in an “all-weather reconnaissance drone for infantry needs”. The “Albatross M5” was exactly the kind of drone the Russian side would find profitable to sell to Myanmar. At that time, however, the parties had not yet reached an agreement on its purchase, waiting until the end of the “Covid-19 crisis” to hold the drone’s presentation. In response, Florov (1, 2), through Dudov (1, 2), sent to Myanmar a commercial offer for the “Albatross M5” UAV complex in Russian and English (1, 2, 3) and an English-language presentation of the “Albatross” company detailing its UAV, equipment, and technologies. Htet then requested an additional commercial offer for a ground control station and two UAVs (one for daytime and one for nighttime surveillance). Its final version was sent in early May and included training of Myanmar operators by Albatross staff, who would later control the supplied UAVs. Sending Albatross test drones to Myanmar At the end of May 2020, Set-1 started preparing documents for the temporary export of UAVs to Myanmar, presumably for demonstration flights. The next day, while drafting Florov’s response, Dudov suggested adding a note about the radio channel produced by Set-1: “We also consider it our duty to remind you that the radio channel for the Albatross project is produced by SET-1, a company that previously developed and produced radio channels for the URAN multifunctional robotic combat systems on behalf of the Russian Ministry of Defense. During your last visit to the Russian Federation, you could see these combat systems in action at a military plant near Moscow. We want to emphasize that the SET-1 company has extensive experience in developing and producing radio channels for the needs of the Russian security and defense sectors. SET-1 is listed among the recommended manufacturers of these products for the needs of the Russian security and defense sectors.” This likely refers to the Uran-6 robotic demining system and the Uran-9 multifunctional robotic complex, which Russia has deployed in the wars in Syria and Ukraine (1, 2, 3). In mid-July 2020, Htet wrote (1, 2, 3, 4) about “additional interest from senior management” and the possibility of purchasing UAVs during the fiscal year. He also asked whether they could “provide a target designator on the platform”, suggesting that the Myanmar military may have intended to use the UAV not just for reconnaissance, but for guiding high-precision munitions — a tactic Russian forces also use in the war against Ukraine. In late August 2020, Htet asked (1, 2, 3, 4) Russian partners to provide the documents required to obtain a military import and export permit. In mid-October, preparations for shipping the UAV to Myanmar were already underway (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). The UAV departed on November 21, 2020 (1, 2, 3, 4), cleared customs at Russia’s Domodedovo airport and arrived in Yangon, Myanmar, on November 27, 2020. In early December 2020, both parties agreed (1, 2) to extend the contract for the free provision of the demo UAV until June 1, 2021, as the UAV wouldnʼt have enough time to return to Russia by the end of 2020. In late December, Alliance CEO Win Min Hein announced the arrival of the Albatross M5 in Myanmar and the start of flight tests. The Myanmar Air Force also requested information on the updated ground target tracking software and its ability to measure coordinates. It’s likely that the Myanmar military was already aware of earlier Albatross developments under the Start-2 project, which they planned to use for military purposes. Albatross reported (1, 2) on the available options for upgrading the Albatross M5 UAV, including an onboard computer with an AI-based target identification system and a camera-based tracking and coordinate-measurement system. These upgrades were presumably based on Albatross developments from the Odyssey and Start-2 projects. Albatross confirmed that it was possible to install all the components required for operating such a system on the UAV they had demonstrated as part of the modernization order. They also expressed their readiness to provide these components to Myanmar “in the future”. The test flight was scheduled for December 28, 2020. In January 2021, Alliance CEO Soe Thiha Hlaing (Facebook) sent (1, 2) a letter reporting that the company was already preparing to introduce the Albatross M5 to other branches of the Myanmar Armed Forces (except the Air Force) and state institutions. He suggested that Albatross sign an official Memorandum of Agreement, granting Alliance exclusive rights to the Myanmar market for the Albatross M5 UAV and other products developed and manufactured by Albatross. In January 2021, Gontarenko (“Mr. Slava”) received a document from Florov (“Albatross”) and Dudov (head of special projects at “Set-1”) outlining new UAV prices in Russian rubles. The document began by listing the prices Albatross had proposed in 2020. It explained that the planned 25% increase accounted for “lost VAT”, a markup reflecting the increase in Russian prices from 2021, and the costs and risks already incurred by Russia in transferring equipment to Myanmar. Gontarenko’s margin was set at 17%, and it was proposed that this percentage be fixed as a discount on all future Albatross equipment sold to Myanmar. The logistics partners in this agreement was LLC “Simplex Corporation”. At the end of the document, a postscript read: “As is known, the Russian Defense Minister recently visited Myanmar and signed an agreement for the supply of Orlan-10E UAVs by Rosoboronexport. The TsPSBS organization (the official Orlan training center) approached us to have Albatross specialists train Myanmar Orlan-10E operators in Russia. Our specialists are also trained in operating these Orlan-10 series UAVs at the Orlan training center. This information is intended to underscore the seriousness of Russia’s and, in particular, Albatross LLC’s intentions regarding cooperation with Myanmar. At the same time, we ask that this information be considered a commercial secret of our correspondence.” In April 2021, an Albatross test UAV was shipped back (1, 2, 3) from Myanmar to Russia. According to the air waybill and customs declaration, with an appendix, the drone arrived at Domodedovo Airport on April 18, 2021, and cleared customs on April 22, 2021. Military coup in Myanmar and Russia’s role in it In February 2021, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu arrived in Myanmar. Just ten days after his official visit, a coup d’état took place in Myanmar, orchestrated by Min Aung Hlaing, the country’s commander-in-chief, whom Shoigu had met just days earlier. Some analysts believe that Russia either endorsed the idea of a military coup in Myanmar during Shoigu’s visit or was at least aware of the junta’s plans (1, 2). Apart from the visit right before the coup, Shoigu had been to Myanmar twice in the previous 7 years (1, 2), meeting with the future junta leader each time. Hlaing, on the other hand, had visited Russia six times during that period. As a result, the two countries concluded agreements to supply the Myanmar army with Russian Su-30 fighters, Yak-130 combat training aircraft, and Mi-17 helicopters (1, 2, 3). Earlier, Russia had already sold other weapons to Myanmar: MiG-29 aircraft, Mi-35P, Mi-24 and Mi-2 helicopters, Pechora-2M anti-aircraft missile systems, armored vehicles, artillery systems and radar stations(1, 2, 3, 4). These were later repaired and modernized in Russia (1, 2), and eventually at a Joint Technical Center established in Myanmar. Myanmar’s military units regularly participated in the International Army Games and combat training events organized by Russia. During Shoigu’s visit in January 2021, the countries agreed on the sale of the Orlan-10E UAVs, Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile systems and radar stations. After the coup, the democratically elected government in Myanmar was overthrown, triggering mass protests. According to a UN report from September 2024, at least 5,350 civilians were killed, more than 3.3 million people were displaced, and more than half of the population now lives below the poverty line — mainly due to violence by the national armed forces. In October 2024, the Washington Post reported that the Myanmar military increasingly relied on drones to carry out deadly strikes against rebel forces and civilians. At the time of the military coup, the Myanmar Air Force already had a test model of the Albatross M5 UAV, which Russia had sent in late 2020. According to a document found in the archive, Albatross went on to conduct remote training sessions for Myanmar UAV operators in 2021, along with demonstration flights for senior military officials. Russian soldiers use the Albatross M5 UAVs in the war against Ukraine for reconnaissance and artillery adjustment. While Russian military experts praise their effectiveness, the Ukrainian Defense Forces still manage to shoot these drones down. Cooperation between Russia and Myanmar after the coup After the coup, Myanmar found itself in international isolation — and Russia quickly stepped in to deepen their ties. In March 2021, Russia’s Deputy Minister of Defense was the only foreign representative to attend Myanmar’s military parade. Just a few months later, in June, at Shoigu’s invitation, Hlaing visited Moscow, his second foreign visit since seizing power. It was no surprise that in February 2022, Hlaing openly supported Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In July 2022, Hlaing and Kiaw returned to Moscow to meet with Shoigu once again. They discussed Myanmar’s potential purchase of Russia’s fuel, as well as plans for Russia to build nuclear power plants and oil wells in Myanmar. In August 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived in Myanmar to meet Hlaing and the junta-appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wunna Maung Lwin. A month later, Hlaing met with Putin. According to the Russian publication The Insider, the talks focused on military cooperation. In the first year after the coup alone, Russia supplied Myanmar with $276 million worth of weapons and military equipment. However, the war in Ukraine soon led to a shortage of components in Russia. In July 2023, Russian troops were first documented using Myanmar-made mines in the war against Ukraine. Two months later, reports confirmed the use of another type of Myanmar mines by Russian invaders. In March 2025, Hlaing traveled to Russia again, met with Putin, and signed an agreement to build a Russian nuclear power plant in Myanmar. He once again supported the Russian invasion of Ukraine and expressed confidence in Russia’s victory. Later, Hlaing also met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, noting the growing cooperation between the armed forces of the countries. In May 2025, Hlaing attended the parade in Moscow — his sixth visit to Russia since the 2021 military coup. Beyond the nuclear power plants and wind energy projects by Rosatom, Russia is also building a port, a coal-fired thermal power plant, and an oil refinery in Myanmar. The Russian payment system “Mir” began operating in Myanmar, and bilateral trade increased by 40% in 2024 alone. In early February 2021, the day after the military coup in Myanmar, the Russian side began discussing and drafting a letter to the “Alliance” (1, 2). In it, “Albatross” expressed its awareness of the situation in Myanmar, noting: “We consider disciplined democracy to be an important factor in the proper development of bilateral cooperation and hope that the changes in your country will give us an additional impetus to strengthen friendship and economic cooperation between our countries.” In response, Soe Sikha Hlaing, CEO of Alliance, assured (1, 2, 3) the Russians that the work was “proceeding according to plan.” He also shared a request from the Air Force to increase the number of UAV takeoffs and landings covered by the warranty, since the proposed 50 cycles were, according to the military, “insufficient and well below their expectations.” He also asked for a “non-binding proposal” for updating the automatic tracking system for moving objects and the image recognition software that could be included in the main package. By the time the initial stage of the military coup began on February 1, 2021, the Albatross M5 UAV was already in Myanmar, and its return had been postponed at the request of Myanmar. They also expressed interest in new capabilities that could help identify and track targets during combat operations against opponents of the coup. As of late 2020, Albatross had neither a laser rangefinder-based target designation system nor a UAV video-feed system for tracking and identifying targets. Negotiations with a potential customer were only underway for the development of the first system, while the software component of the second system, being developed under the Start-2 project, was still in progress and expected to be ready by May 2021. During negotiations, Albatross offered the Myanmar military UAV capabilities that did not yet exist. In June 2017, the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing (then still only the future leader of the military coup) visited Russia together with Lieutenant General Soe Htut, a senior officer of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief (Army) and Brigadier General Nyunt Swe, Myanmar Military Attaché to Russia. On June 20, the delegation attended an arms exhibition at the 766th Production and Technological Equipment Directorate(renamed the Special Design Bureau of the Russian Ministry of Defense from January 2023), where they were welcomed by Yevgeny Khlebtikov, Deputy Director General of Set-1. An article covering the visit was also published on the Set-1 website, though the page has been deleted and has been inaccessible since 2020. According to the publication, the Russian Ministry of Defense hosted the Myanmar delegation, and Senior General Hlaing paid particular attention to the armored vehicles on display. He also showed interest in the anti-terrorist robotic systems “Scarab” and “Sphere”, produced by JSC “Set-1”. The Sphere is a spherical robotic device designed for quickly capturing audio and video in hard-to-reach and dangerous areas, transmitting the data via radio to a video surveillance and remote control console. The Scarab serves as an autonomous ground transporter for the Sphere. Both systems were deployed by Russia in Syria. Florov’s computer dump also contains a folder named “Bulochnikov” — the surname of the previously mentioned president of the Society for Friendship and Cooperation with the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. Inside this folder, the Molfar Intelligence Institute found many more documents, including tables with price calculations for an anti-drone system and an Albatross UAV. One table, “Domestic Price Calculation,” last edited in August 2022, shows extra costs for Albatross delivery. The initial price was artificially increased by 10%, labelled “increase for further discount,” and another 20% went as a “contribution to Alexander”. This likely refers to Alexander Ostrovsky, a graduate of the Military Institute of Foreign Languages of the USSR, Vice President of the Society for Friendship and Cooperation with the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, and until 2024, Counselor at the Russian Embassy in Myanmar. In 2014, he wrote an article, openly criticizing the United States and arguing that Russia and Myanmar could strengthen their strategic cooperation, allowing Myanmar to avoid being caught between the US and China. Unlike the US, which relies on pressure and democratic rhetoric, Russia was presented as a stable, reliable partner capable of protecting its interests in Southeast Asia alongside Myanmar. The calculation also specified the share Embassy Counselor Ostrovsky was set to receive if an agreement with Myanmar went through. In early 2023, Albatross was moved to the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan, where Russian teams began working intensively to localize the production of Shahed attack UAVs. Florov continued upgrading the Albatross M5 UAV, improving its features for combat conditions, including its resistance to electronic warfare, spoofing and video channel hacking. Albatross had not forgotten about Myanmar. In the “Myanmar” folder from Florov’s computer dump, an English-language presentation titled “Albatros M5 Military”, last edited in late July 2023, was found. It highlights the combat capabilities of “Albatros M5”, particularly its object-tracking functions, target coordinate calculation from video, AR overlays on UAV footage, and integration with battlefield control systems and other information services. It also emphasized the drone’s ability to share screenshots and coordinates with specialized battlefield control software or via Telegram during the flight. Telegram’s ongoing ties with Russia, persisting after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, have been widely reported (1, 2). The Russian side emphasized that this “equipment has been tested in real combat conditions of the special military operation” — in other words, it was used by Russian forces during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At the end of the presentation, Albatross lists its main product lines, including loitering munitions. The slide on those reads: “We produce a line of loitering munitions with intelligent guidance systems. We also produce foreign heavy loitering munitions under license.” It also includes a screenshot from a demo video of the target-acquisition and search system, as well as photos and mock-ups of the following UAVs: the Iranian Shahed 136, already in active use against Ukraine at that time. Albatross, together with staff from other Russian organizations and institutions, was developing a version of the UAV-U — an aircraft-type strike drone — based on the Iranian Shahed-101 and Shahed-107 UAVs to use it in the war against Ukraine. new military drones produced by Albatross, intended to be used in the war against Ukraine, in particular as reconnaissance UAVs and decoys (“false targets”) (1, 2). These UAVs are also mentioned in the recovered documentation under the working name “Albazavr”. The Russians likely highlighted loitering munitions in the presentation to spark Myanmar’s interest in these UAVs — and they could be supplied to the junta in the future. An English-language price offer for the Albatross M5 UAV was also found in the “Myanmar” folder, created in late August 2023. The document’s author is Konstantin Spiridonov, a co-owner of “Albatross” and “Chief Designer for the Production of Motor Boats” of Alabuga. As is known, Russia and Iran have used the term “motor boats” to refer to the Shahed-line UAVs. Each package in the offer included two Albatross M5 UAVs with all required payloads and equipment, in particular, coordinate-measurement systems and video-stream object tracking. Myanmar was given options to purchase 1, 5, 50, or 100 UAVs, with different delivery schedules and prices per unit. The document also openly indicated the address Albatross at JSC “Special Economic Zone “Alabuga”: Republic of Tatarstan, city of Yelabuga, SEZ Alabuga, ul. Sh-1, building 8.1 — the same facility that at that time was producing Russian modifications of the Shahed-136 drones. This folder also contains a PDF document of the same price offer, created by Spiridonov just three hours later that day. The presentation and the price offer were likely sent to Myanmar by Albatross either directly by Albatross employees or through Dudov or Ostrovsky. In early February 2024, Florov received an email from Dudov titled, “Answer on our topic — our beloved Myanmar!”. Dudov summarized his conversation with Ostrovsky, outlining the history of contacts with Myanmar: “starting with the story with Slava [Gontarenko], then Anatoly Bulochnikov, and then everything else.” Dudov also quoted Ostrovsky’s response: “Everything is correct what you’re saying, Sasha. The key issue is reporting the project to the end user. We reported on Albatross... From what you told me, Albatross is ready to produce and sell its technologies. We’ve only just gained access to the UAV factories in Myanmar. Believe me, leaders and even ministers don’t have this access. They have their own operations... including China! We’ll come up with something. Be patient!”. Cooperation between Albatross and Myanmar seemed to have slowed. This is partly reflected in a 2024 Washington Post article, in which the reporter reached out to Dudov to ask about the Russia-Myanmar partnership. Dudov initially mistook the reporter for a Myanmar military representative and responded: “We love and remember your beautiful country very much! With great pleasure, we are ready for a longer-term mutually beneficial cooperation between our friendly countries!” Yet the same Washington Post article, citing the analytical company Sayari, reports that the Myanmar military is already purchasing Albatross M5 UAVs. Given Russia’s close ties with Myanmar, it’s likely some drones were sold or at least may receive an order from them at any time, especially as the junta’s need for drones to suppress rebel resistance grows. Russia uses its military industry not only as a tool of armed aggression against Ukraine, but also as an instrument to expand its influence in Asia. In fact, Moscow used drones to buy the loyalty of Myanmar. Russia had a presence in the country even before the coup, likely aided its planning, and supplied drones to the junta during the uprisings. With democratic countries turning their backs on Myanmar after the coup, Russia has been able to expand its influence in Asia.
