By Horseed Staff

Copyright horseedmedia

What’s new? Somalia is heading toward more political tumult. The government’s electoral reforms, planned to take effect in 2026, have prompted fierce resistance from opponents who view these as a bid to tilt the scales in the incumbent president’s favour. Left unaddressed, the standoff could turn even more violent.

Why does it matter? Squabbling among political elites has shifted attention away from priorities such as the battle against the jihadist group Al-Shabaab. It may also encourage Somalia’s foreign backers to dial back their engagement, which could further weaken the federal government.

What should be done? The Somali government and its opponents need to fashion a compromise by agreeing to hold direct elections in districts where possible, while negotiating an improved version of the indirect electoral system for upcoming state and national polls. They should also develop a roadmap toward universal suffrage for future contests.

Somalia is heading toward the familiar terrain of an electoral dispute, bringing with it the risk of a fresh flare-up of violence. Borrowing from his predecessor’s playbook, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud introduced a package of electoral reforms, moving from an indirect system in which clan leaders represent constituents to a “one person, one vote” model. Opponents of the change, including rival politicians and assertive subnational units known as federal member states, believe it is designed to favour the president’s bid for re-election in polls due in 2026. Important constituencies are in effect boycotting the process, with parallels to the electoral strife of 2021-2022, which saw street fighting in Mogadishu and polls delayed for over a year. The government has recently shown a newfound openness to rejig its plans, but an electoral framework with broad buy-in remains out of reach. To ease tensions, the government and opponents of the reforms should agree to hold direct votes in districts where possible, and negotiate more representative indirect elections as a halfway house to universal suffrage for state and national polls.

The electoral standoff comes at a perilous moment. In 2025, the Somali government suffered major setbacks in its war against the jihadist group Al-Shabaab and is in the midst of a peacekeeping transition, with an uncertain future for the African Union’s Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). This mission, which remains crucial to the federal government’s standing by containing Al-Shabaab within rural areas of south and central Somalia, lacks dedicated funding. With Somalia’s traditional partners increasingly disillusioned by the lack of progress in a host of areas, including security, governance and inclusive politics, another election-related crisis could spur further reductions in donor support for a weak and underperforming federal government.

Recent history suggests that concerns over looming electoral unrest are warranted. During the 2021 elections, the federal government – led at the time by President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, or “Farmajo” – proposed a one person, one vote election before reversing course after pushback from federal state leaders and political competitors. Later, he attempted to extend his term in office by two years due to disagreements over the polls, tipping Somalia close to a major conflict. Fighting broke out between clan-based factions within the national army in Mogadishu. Farmajo eventually lost at the ballot box after a lengthy and disruptive delay that cost Somalia international goodwill and distracted the government from its day-to-day responsibilities, including the campaign against Al-Shabaab.

Those eager to dislodge President Mohamud worry that rapid introduction of the new [electoral] system will cramp their election chances.

At root, the tensions both on this occasion and under Farmajo are less about the proposal for universal suffrage – which few politicians openly oppose – than the benefits that might accrue from a change in system. Like his predecessor, President Mohamud views reform as a way to improve his re-election prospects. Those eager to dislodge President Mohamud worry that rapid introduction of the new system will cramp their election chances. Moreover, the electoral reforms form part of a wider package of constitutional amendments that Mohamud’s critics claim centralise power in Mogadishu, and specifically the presidency.

Political tensions are rising as the polls approach, despite the increasing likelihood that the government will not be able to implement the bulk of its electoral reforms in time. District elections were due by the end of June 2025 but are being pushed back; the government now plans to hold its pilot district elections in Mogadishu on 30 October 2025. State level polls had been set for September 2025 but will also be delayed; and national parliamentary and presidential polls should be held by May 2026. Wrangling has intensified as differences over who controls elections at both the state and national level widen between member states that are run more independently from Mogadishu, such as Puntland and Jubaland, and the federal government.

To prevent renewed unrest in the run-up to next year’s polls, the government and its opponents need to agree on a workable electoral framework that can be organised within the government’s remaining mandate but stops short of full universal suffrage for all elections, which is an unrealistic goal in the near term; has buy-in from major political constituencies; and sets down a road map for the future implementation of a one person, one vote system. Direct elections should be held in districts wherever they are possible – such as Mogadishu – since these would represent a milestone in the country’s path towards a genuine public vote. For state and national polls, a revamped indirect election is more feasible in the short timeframe to the next vote, but reforms could still increase the number of Somalis who will choose their next leaders, lifting the electorate from its 2021 total of around 28,000 voters.

President Mohamud’s August 2025 concessions over constitutional reforms, and his pledge to continue discussing electoral changes with the opposition, are an important first step toward negotiating a more workable framework for future votes. They have not, however, resolved the tensions, particularly as Puntland and Jubaland remain absent from these discussions. Somalia’s international partners should apply pressure on both the government and all of the opposition to come together for genuine discussions sooner rather than later – if necessary, by playing a mediating role to get all sides to the table, and making clear that without a peaceful settlement to the country’s recurrent election quandary, further interruptions to aid flows are likely.

II.The Pitfalls of Universal Suffrage

Somalia’s last elections under a multi-party system with universal suffrage were held in 1969, months before Siad Barre, who ruled the country for more than twenty years, came to power in a military coup.1 After the fall of Barre in 1991 and the collapse of the Somali state, there were no elections until the reconstitution of the country’s central authority in the 2000s, initially as a transitional government which later became the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012. Under the new voting system, the country chose leaders through indirect elections, relying on clan elders to select members of parliament, or MPs, who then choose the president. More recently, Somali presidents have pushed to return to universal suffrage, only to find their way blocked by political rivals.

A.Incumbent Disadvantage

Although the voting system has remained indirect, it has evolved over time. In the 2012 electoral cycle, 135 clan elders (all men) selected the entirety of parliament’s 275 seats. In 2016, Somalia introduced a new system, whereby elders selected electoral colleges of 51 clan members for each parliamentary seat, who in turn voted for the MPs.2 In 2021, the size of the electoral colleges grew to 101 members each, meaning nearly 28,000 Somalis participated in the process.3 Women are allocated 30 per cent of the seats in both electoral colleges and parliament, but in practice their proportion of seats has fallen short of this quota.4

One consequence of indirect polls is that re-election is arduous. Somalia’s intricate clan system ensures that political power is so diffuse and fractious that it is difficult for a sitting leader to marshal a wide enough coalition to be re-elected, especially if initial election victory depended on making promises to numerous clans and sub-groups that could not later be fulfilled. There is also an informal expectation that power will rotate among clans.5

As a result, incumbents tend to believe that the most expedient way for them to stay in office is by bypassing entrenched clan and political elites and including more Somalis in the electoral process.6 Clan elders for their part do not seem to oppose universal suffrage on principle. Although elders might appear to prefer the indirect system because it assures them greater sway over the results, they are perfectly able to exercise considerable influence under conditions of universal suffrage as voting would still take place largely along clan lines, as seen in the case of Somaliland.7 That said, the built-in anti-incumbent advantage in the current system is one that political opponents would prefer not to change. The various opponents of the government are also reluctant to accept the delays in the electoral calendar that often appear to accompany changes to the voting system.8

Meanwhile, leaders of federal member states are more able to influence the outcome of indirect elections and thus seek to retain the current model.9 Member states are often locked in conflict with Mogadishu over the division of power and resources within Somalia’s federal system, and aim to steer national elections so that an ally ends up president. Some member state leaders have also run for the presidency, further stoking the desire to shape electoral outcomes in their favour.

B.Failed Reforms

The first major attempt to introduce universal suffrage came under President Farmajo.10 In February 2020, he signed into law a bill outlining a one person, one vote system for the next elections, which were due the following year. Many opposition politicians suspected the real aim was to extend his tenure in office, especially since the law was passed only a year before polls were due.11 The government struggled to explain how it could organise one person, one vote elections in a tight timeframe within a limited budget and amid an ongoing Al-Shabaab insurgency – though the expectation was elections would be held only in government-controlled zones. Just months before the election cycle was supposed to begin, in August 2020, the government dropped its plans and reverted to an indirect election. Even so, disputes over details stalled organisation of the polls and in February 2021 the government’s four-year term expired without a path forward agreed between Somalia’s main political forces, and with no elections in sight.

Serious unrest was soon to follow. The government took matters into its own hands, and in April 2021 parliament announced a two-year extension of both its and the president’s terms. In response, members of Somalia’s armed forces aligned with opposition politicians, mostly hailing from the Hawiye clan that dominates Mogadishu and its surroundings, flooded the capital to oppose the extension. They called this mobilisation Badbaado Qaran, or “National Salvation”. Clashes with government forces killed dozens and compelled the authorities to scrap the changes to the electoral calendar. Farmajo then agreed to hand over control of the election process to Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble to calm the opposition, whose members still did not trust the president to organise the polls.12

It took another year to complete the indirect elections, leading to a prolonged standoff that saw Somalia teetering on the edge of conflict. Under sustained international pressure, including the suspension of EU budgetary support and U.S. visa restrictions on individuals seen as spoilers, parliamentary polls began in November 2021.13 On 15 May 2022, parliament selected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud for his second term as president (he first held the role from 2012 to 2017). Despite extensive manipulation and vote-buying throughout the electoral cycle – much of which went unchallenged amid a dearth of impartial and robust oversight mechanisms – political elites from all sides accepted the outcome.14

While Somalia narrowly dodged more serious electoral unrest, the episode proved damaging for the country given the violence and thoroughly corrupted voting process. The poll also represented a distraction from the day-to-day business of government and undermined a number of other priorities, particularly curbing Al-Shabaab’s grip over large swathes of rural south and central Somalia or efforts to bolster its clandestine presence in Mogadishu.15 This diversion of attention greatly frustrated Somalia’s international partners, which the government relies on for both security and financing, and exacerbated foreign donors’ already declining enthusiasm for long-term engagement in the country.16

III.Mohamud’s Bid for Electoral Reform

Soon after his electoral victory in May 2022, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud started planning for the next elections. Like his predecessor, Mohamud called for universal suffrage. He embedded changes to the electoral system within a series of amendments aimed at finalising the provisional constitution, triggering intense opposition. Many political opponents – including the leadership of Puntland, Somalia’s oldest and most established member state – saw the changes as designed to centralise power.

The government first convened the National Consultative Council (NCC) – a group including the president, prime minister, the heads of federal member states and the mayor of Mogadishu – to consider political reforms to Somalia’s judicial system, financial set-up, security architecture and electoral framework. Following meetings in 2022 and 2023, the NCC, with the exception of Puntland after it pulled out of the grouping early in 2023 to protest against what it saw as Mogadishu’s domineering hand (see below), came to a landmark agreement in May 2023 calling for universal suffrage at all levels by 2026. Mohamud combined the proposed electoral redesign with other NCC agreements to form the basis of a wider reform of Somalia’s provisional constitution.17

The government tabled the first four chapters of the constitutional review, covering reforms to the state, citizenship rights, land and property, and most controversially, elections, before parliament in early 2024. After making some adjustments, both houses unanimously passed the chapters in March last year.18 Many provisions, however, generated controversy.19 These included mandating the direct election of the president (currently, a vote in parliament determines who will hold the office); granting the president the power to remove the prime minister (previously this was parliament’s role); limiting the number of political parties to three (which would also restrict the presidential contest to three candidates); and creating a national electoral commission responsible for all elections, replacing the states’ commissions.20 While parliament passed the legislation, this was not necessarily due to widespread enthusiasm for the government’s project but instead came down to the administration’s effective gaming of the system (some parliamentary votes are up for sale, and the government offered incentives to MPs to galvanise their support).21

The [national election] commission sees district elections, which it ambitiously aimed to hold in 50 to 60 districts, as a rehearsal for state and national polls in 2026.

Parliamentary approval paved the way for the formation of the eighteen-member Independent National Electoral and Boundaries Commission (INEBC) in November 2024, tasked with overseeing all elections.22 The electoral commission got to work in early 2025, focusing on the first step in the electoral calendar – district council polls, initially scheduled for the end of June but which have yet to occur.23It launched a voter registration drive in Mogadishu in April, which it has extended to member state capitals and secondary cities. The commission sees district elections, which it ambitiously aimed to hold in 50 to 60 districts, as a rehearsal for state and national polls in 2026.24 The stakes of these district polls were designed to be unusually high in another respect: the three political associations that score the highest vote shares in district elections would become Somalia’s national parties for the next ten years.25 Mogadishu seemed to be using the provision to narrow the bloc of political competitors, prompting leading opponents into boycotting the district polls.26

Even though the commission insists that district, along with state and national elections, will take place wherever possible, security conditions remain a challenge.27 Al-Shabaab launched a major offensive in February 2025 aimed at rolling back government gains made in 2022-23 in central Somalia during the early part of Mohamud’s presidency. The future of the African Union mission, vital in securing urban areas that keep the insurgents at bay and enable Somalia’s military and allied clan militias to go on the offensive, is uncertain. It is also short of funding, limiting its capabilities.28 Insecurity is likely to restrict the geographic reach of district polls, while the ongoing dispute over how to implement elections distracts the government and spurs political divisions, undermining Mogadishu’s attempts to marshal a unified military response to the militants.

In any event, as political challenges to the elections have mounted, time has also started to run out for the reforms to be carried out despite the government’s efforts to push ahead. While the electoral commission remains committed to rapid implementation, the failure to hold district polls on time in June 2025 demonstrates the challenges it is facing. It now plans to hold district council elections in Mogadishu alone on 30 October 2025, using this as a pilot run before expanding to other cities later on.

IV.The Pushback

Despite the progress made in drawing up reforms to the election system, political cracks quickly appeared. Roughly speaking, opposition comes from two camps: the leadership of some federal member states – which have had a formal role in discussing the elections through the National Consultative Council – and the president’s political opponents, who intend to run for the presidency but have had little formal input into the reform process. As noted above, both camps generally fear constitutional reforms will centralise power in Mogadishu and give it greater influence over electoral proceedings, but each is weighing a different set of specific calculations. Puntland is more concerned by the impact of constitutional changes on its power as a sub-national state and preserving the substantial role it played in overseeing the 2021-22 elections; Jubaland is focused on securing the legitimacy of state elections it held in late 2024 against Mogadishu’s wishes; and opposition politicians are seeking a national electoral system that gives them the best chances of success.

At the state level, the electoral dispute has already turned violent. Clashes between the Jubaland administration and federal government broke out in December 2024 and between July and August 2025. On the political front, the make-up of the opposition is similar to the group that opposed Farmajo in 2021-2022 – although, in this case, they are protesting against Mohamud’s reforms. The opposition is also less united this time, in part due to bad blood created as they competed against each other during that earlier period of protest, although signs are emerging that they are beginning to coalesce. In combination, these sources of opposition are likely to impede the government’s ability to complete the scheduled elections throughout Somalia.

A.Resistance from Federal Member States

The strongest and most organised pushback against the government’s electoral plans comes from the leadership of some of Somalia’s federal member states, particularly Puntland and Jubaland. Puntland has regularly clashed with Mogadishu over the division of power within Somalia’s federal system. It suspended its participation in the NCC in early 2023, complaining that Mogadishu was imposing a centralised vision of governance at the expense of Somalia’s federal roots.29 Puntland’s leadership took particular issue with the constitutional reform proposals emerging from the consultative council, complaining that Mogadishu had dominated their design.30 The boycott, however, prevented Puntland from providing its input into the electoral agreement. Some officials in Mogadishu say this is par for the course: Puntland tends to participate when it gets its way, and torpedo proceedings when it does not.31

Jubaland’s opposition to electoral reform escalated in late 2024, after its leadership changed its mind over the issue of control over state elections. The consultative council agreement held that all state elections should be conducted at the same time under a centralised electoral commission, rather than run by the states at different times, as has occurred previously.32

State leaders initially agreed with the proposal even though it required them to give up formal control over their own polls, likely persuaded by the extra time in office it would entail.33 Jubaland’s president, Ahmed Madobe, first accepted the reform, but changed tack later on.34 Once it became clear that the November 2024 deadline for direct state elections would be missed, Madobe broke ranks and stated he would hold indirect elections in the old style instead of waiting for a new system to be established.35 Madobe seemed to have concluded that it would be better to organise his own indirect polls at that point with the goal of securing a full additional five-year term, rather than gain another year in office at the cost of surrendering control over the state’s polls to the new national electoral commission. In effect, Madobe exploited the delays in the polls as an excuse to break with Mogadishu, having already received a partial term extension.36

Acting in defiance of the federal government, Madobe oversaw a tightly controlled indirect election and secured another term in office.37 Mogadishu declared the elections “illegal” and began sending federal troops to the Ras Kamboni area bordering Kenya.38 Fearing that Mogadishu was planning to remove him from power, Madobe struck first, with Jubaland’s troops attacking federal forces on 11 December 2024.39 The result was disastrous for the federal government: dozens of soldiers died while hundreds fled across the border to Kenya.40 The clash gave an unequivocal demonstration of how disputes over Somali elections can quickly turn violent. It also showed the limits of the federal government’s power, exposing its inability to implement its electoral plans in the face of regional resistance. By July, the tussle shifted to Jubaland’s northern Gedo region, as local supporters of both sides clashed repeatedly in a bid to assert dominance.41 The prospect of increased insecurity along its border alarmed neighbouring Kenya, which is seeking to mediate between the parties.42

The leaders of [federal member states] Puntland and Jubaland … are united by joint grievances against the federal government’s electoral plans.

The leaders of Puntland and Jubaland have a recent history of mutual antagonism, but are united by joint grievances against the federal government’s electoral plans. Though their core concerns are different – Puntland is preoccupied by the constitutional changes while Jubaland is geared toward securing acceptance of its state election – the two have started to coordinate openly. Madobe visited Garowe in June 2025 and announced an alliance with Puntland state President Said Deni, a new chapter in their relationship following earlier frictions.43

One unspoken concern that unites the two leaders is that shifting to direct elections under a national electoral commission would reduce their states’ ability to hand pick MPs, which has given them a large amount of influence over the presidential election.44 During the 2021-2022 election, both Puntland and Jubaland firmly opposed direct presidential elections.45 Many political observers noted that Deni was planning to run for president of Somalia and that changes to the voting system could damage his prospects.46 Despite losing in 2022, it is widely expected that Deni will run again, incorporating lessons from his failed bid to boost his chances.47 This has intensified the push from Puntland and Jubaland to retain indirect selection for MPs and re-introduce state-level electoral commissions to oversee the vote, thus providing member state leaders with greater control over the choice of the next president.48

The other three federal member states – Galmudug, Hirshabelle and Southwest – along with the newly formed North Eastern state, are still going along with Mohamud’s reforms.49 They are weaker and more dependent on Mogadishu economically and for security. In addition, due to their term extensions, the leaders no longer owe their mandates to their capitals but to Mogadishu, which authorised the latest extensions.50 This gives the federal government greater leverage, and it has established working, albeit shallow, political alliances with these member state leaders to pursue its agenda.51 Little is certain, however, and these remaining pro-Mogadishu member states could yet follow Jubaland’s lead and chart a separate course to retain autonomous control over their state elections.52

B.Mohamud’s Electoral Opponents

The other major source of opposition to the government’s plans comes from the men who plan to run against Mohamud for the presidency, some of whom allied with him to unseat Farmajo during the 2022 elections. As mentioned above, they worry that the new system will benefit the incumbent, giving Mohamud’s administration undue influence over electoral proceedings. Like the member states opposed to the reform, they believe it represents a power grab that centralises control within the executive. They are also concerned that major changes could wind up delaying polls. The top opponents of the reforms previously held senior government positions, including former presidents Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Farmajo, and former prime minister, Hassan Ali Khaire. Most of these politicians have united around a common platform to protest against the upcoming elections, launching the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) in May 2025, though some of its members defected in August (see next section).53

The government batted away the opposition initially, but has started to engage with it. It had argued that because opposition leaders do not hold official positions, they have no mandate to weigh in.54 Opposition leaders countered that since they will be running in the election, they have a right to provide input on the model that will be used.55 The government has also encountered resistance from MPs: when it submitted the proposed changes to parliament in 2024, some parliamentarians urged the government to hold off pending wider consultation.56

The opposition has tried to establish an alliance with the member states that are critical of the federal government’s plans, but they have struggled to reach a common position (see next section).57 Though limited for now, the influence of opposition figures will likely grow as the end of Mohamud’s term approaches and political elites start to gather round in support of new candidates to challenge him.

C.Attempts at Compromise

While the government argues with some justification that opposition to its plans stems primarily from political opportunists who resist change, there is still a lack of broad consensus over the ideal electoral model. Without broader agreement, the path to fresh elections could deepen political divisions and potentially spill into violence.

The government appears to be attuned to these risks. In June, President Mohamud held a consultative forum with civil society and political association members to discuss the constitutional reform and elections, in addition to starting a dialogue with the Somali Salvation Front members.58 One important shift has been the SSF’s acceptance that Somalia should not blindly re-use the 2021 election system, though its members have stopped short of endorsing Mohamud’s election reforms – a position that puts distance between them and the member states that are critical of the reforms.59

The government began to make concessions in August. After discussions with a splinter group of politicians who defected from the SSF, the federal authorities announced on 25 August they would walk back some of the more controversial aspects of the constitutional reform package by returning powers to parliament, including the selection of president and its ability to remove the prime minister.60 It also agreed that any political organisation securing at least 10 per cent of seats in the federal parliament will become a national political party, thus severing the connection between the results of the district council elections and eligibility to form a political party. Conversations between the government and political organisations are continuing over other technical changes to the electoral system, which officials say will increase competitiveness and trust in the process.61 All of these agreements, however, remain informal political commitments, and still need to be ratified by parliament.62

The changes [made to the electoral reform plans since August] signal that the government is more open to concessions on certain reforms than just a few months ago.

The changes signal that the government is more open to concessions on certain reforms than just a few months ago. Some in the opposition see this as a genuine response to sustained political resistance.63 Others see it simply as a way for the government to buy time before it decides eventually to extend its term in office.64 For now, the federal authorities continue to insist on direct elections at all levels, while the remaining members of the SSF still oppose the government’s plans, though they have done little to develop alternatives.65 Moreover, no real headway has been made to bring in opposing member states, especially Puntland.66

District council elections in Mogadishu, which are now scheduled for 30 October, should serve as a litmus test for universal suffrage in Somalia. According to the electoral commission, nearly one million people have registered to vote for the Mogadishu polls and enthusiasm for the contest appears genuine, even if there have been numerous reports of forced voter registration to boost the numbers.67 If the government manages to stage a competitive vote, it is likely to push for direct voting for other polls. If the district polls are not held, or the vote goes ahead but is tarnished by major flaws, the opposition will redouble its campaign to stop Somalia from staging direct elections.

V.The Risks of a Contested Election

Despite multiple challenges, and a timetable that is increasingly unworkable, the government continues to push ahead with its plans, while the opposition continues to reject the changes.68 This approach risks sparking the kind of crisis seen during the 2021-2022 electoral cycle. Unrest is not inevitable, however, and many close observers predict Somalia’s political elites will eventually come to agreement.69

If the government continues to push ahead without further compromise, it could lead to an armed stand-off in Mogadishu similar to April 2021, when an influx of armed Hawiye clan members entered the city to oppose President Farmajo’s electoral plans.70 This time, however, clan politics in Mogadishu are different and parallels with past violent confrontations are not automatic. Farmajo, a Marehaan from the Darod clan family, was considered an outsider in Mogadishu, which is primarily inhabited by Hawiye sub-clans. Mohamud, an Abgal from the Hawiye clan family, may benefit from the fact that other Hawiye sub-clans would think twice about challenging him militarily.71 Still, the government appears nervous that opposition will strengthen as the electoral process moves forward.72

The same security concerns surrounding district elections will also apply to state and nationwide polls. Al-Shabaab controls large swathes of the countryside, and has targeted participants in polls – including candidates, clan elders and electoral college members – as well as conducted attacks during past indirect elections.73 As a result, any universal suffrage election would likely be limited in its reach, while even a contest restricted to areas secured by the government and the AU mission would still put voters at risk of future reprisals from the group.

As noted earlier, an Al-Shabaab offensive which began in February 2025 has placed the government under particular strain, as the militants recaptured many areas the government retook in 2022-2023.74 Mogadishu is struggling to respond in large part due to increased political fragmentation, resulting in challenges mobilising an effective fighting force. At the same time, the future of AUSSOM remains uncertain amid a funding crunch. The mission has secured only 15 per cent of its budget for 2025.75 Somalia’s traditional partners are tightening their purse strings while non-traditional donors, particularly the Gulf states, though increasingly active, are unlikely to step in to make up the shortfall.76

Pressing ahead with an electoral process in which large parts of the country are not involved … will further harden the divisions within the Somali federation.

In this setting, the federal government’s electoral plans risk accelerating Somalia’s security challenges and political divisions, particularly between Mogadishu and federal member states. Pressing ahead with an electoral process in which large parts of the country are not involved, either because of abstention or insecurity, will further harden the divisions within the Somali federation. It also will expose the shortcomings of the government, demonstrating the limits of its authority. Given the limited time to organise the polls, any attempt at one person, one vote elections would most likely suffer serious shortfalls in terms of the inclusion of all Somalis, contributing to a highly contested outcome.

Even if there is a compromise on electoral plans, such as reverting to an indirect model for the state and parliamentary polls, it could come too late for the organisers to make meaningful improvements aimed at improving the quality of Somalia’s methods of picking its leaders. Both the government and opposition have reasons to let the clock run down.77 The opposition hopes that as the election deadline approaches and it becomes clear that the government will struggle to implement its plans, its power to shape any changes to the existing system will grow.78 The government also appears comfortable with the status quo, given that if it does not implement an election on time, the default option is to prolong its term. It also wants time to demonstrate that universal suffrage is indeed feasible by holding district council elections in Mogadishu.

More broadly, Somalia appears to be reaching a tipping point, one that could prod external backers to reassess their commitment to the federal project that is still highly dependent upon its mainly Western backers. The country is fragmented, Al-Shabaab is resurgent, the future of the AU peacekeeping mission is uncertain, and donor patience is waning. Another contested electoral cycle could thrust the country into a downward spiral that reinforces the notion that billions of dollars of external backing have brought little progress.

Early in Farmajo’s term, Somalia’s international partners enthusiastically championed universal suffrage, but few are now blindly pressing for one person, one vote polls. Instead, most now support a consultative approach to determine the next electoral model, even if this is indirect.79With several of Somalia’s Western partners already looking to cut their development and humanitarian programs worldwide, the failure to come to a timely agreement on an electoral model would likely lead to further disappointment, reductions in their support and even a belief that a new approach – instead of one premised largely on propping up the federal government – is needed.

VI.Preventing a Crisis and Improving the Polls

An electoral crisis that might tip into violence, particularly in Mogadishu and areas contested between the government and member states, remains possible unless all involved take steps to prevent it. The longer the government and opposition take to agree on an electoral system, the greater the risk that either side resorts to violence to sabotage the process. Avoiding this scenario will require compromise. The government will have to make further concessions regarding the voting process, while the opposition – particularly the leaders of member states – should accept it cannot hold reforms hostage, and stand ready to engage constructively rather than shoot down all proposals. Discussions between the government and some critics of its plans have already begun, and these should press ahead with a view to forging agreements on an election schedule and a format that improves upon earlier indirect polls.

A.Getting Key Players Back to the Table

An important step to alleviate tensions and move closer to an electoral agreement would be for Puntland and Jubaland to return to the National Consultative Council to air their concerns. The government can point to the concessions it has made to date over the constitutional amendments passed by parliament as proof of its readiness to negotiate. It can also put on hold plans to further amend the constitution before the end of its term. Getting to negotiations involving a broad set of Somali interests will likely require bilateral channels with the leaderships of both states to address outstanding issues first, including the legal status of Madobe as president of Jubaland. In return, member states will also need to compromise: Puntland should walk back its demand to cancel all constitutional amendments as a pre-condition for its participation; Jubaland, meanwhile, must agree to discuss the legitimacy of its 2024 state election in order to begin the conversation on electoral reforms.

There are clear incentives for both sides to engage and compromise. The government would assuage mounting domestic and international concern that its plans are impractical and exclude large swathes of the country. For the member states, reconnecting with Mogadishu will bring benefits, for example ensuring they receive their share of international assistance intended for distribution throughout the federal system. There are also political advantages. If Puntland’s leader Deni wishes to run for president, the state will have to return to the federation at some point. Madobe, meanwhile, remains isolated without Mogadishu’s recognition of his self-organised re-election.

International mediation, or at least shuttle diplomacy, may be necessary at first to break the impasse and get the sides talking. The UN, AU and European Union – which, due to their backing for AUSSOM, all have a clear interest in finding a peaceful way out of the current stalemate – could mount a joint diplomatic effort to bring about these talks. This multilateral approach will also help assuage doubts from both the government and opposition about the impartiality of mediators, and thus have a better chance of ensuring their participation.

Other partners that provide bilateral assistance to Somalia can use their influence over the government and its more intransigent opponents to urge both sides to accept mediation and return to the negotiating table. They could make clear that resolution of the electoral conflict will be essential to ensure funding continues to flow, reinforcing the message with high-level calls directly from their capitals. A coordinated front, including the U.S., UK and European member states, alongside influential states in the wider region, such as Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, as well as neighbouring Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, could craft shared messages and apply pressure on all Somali forces to encourage a compromise, in order to have the best chance of breaking the deadlock. All these foreign states have an interest in Somalia’s stability – and thus will want to avoid another electoral crisis.80

B.Devising a More Realistic Electoral Plan

Once they are all at the table, the federal government, member states and the opposition can focus on key areas where agreement is needed. It is then imperative that they should come up with a phased electoral plan.

First, the less contentious district elections should continue under the one person, one vote system. Whereas Crisis Group has adopted a cautious stance regarding direct elections in Somalia in the past, primarily due to technical shortcomings in organising the vote and political divides on the issue, the strides taken toward holding district polls could mark a breakthrough in the road to universal suffrage. The polls in Mogadishu are unlikely to be perfect, but they can serve as a test run for those held later in state capitals and other secondary cities where voters have already been registered.81 Even so, these contests should not be rushed, and particular care should be taken in areas suffering from high political tension or facing security threats. If phased, the authorities could aim to wrap up polls in state capitals and some secondary cities by early 2026, when attention will turn to state and national elections. Districts that are unable to hold elections in that period can do so under the next administration.

Secondly, the federal government should drop its plans to hold a one person, one vote election for state and national parliaments, which would be practically difficult to achieve and politically inflammatory.82 Instead, the government and opposition should agree to a new version of the indirect election model that makes it harder for politicians to interfere with the polls. A new system should seek to expand overall participation by increasing the size of the electoral colleges used to select members of parliament.83 Another innovation would be to combine electoral colleges in each location to form a single bloc that selects all MPs representing that constituency.84

Reforms should not end there. The government should also offer to overhaul the make-up of the electoral commission, bringing its opponents on board in order to increase trust in the institution across the political spectrum. A new model should also include a special independent court to hear electoral challenges: this institution would improve oversight and instil more confidence in election results. Finally, a new system should introduce an election code of conduct based on the principle of mutual non-interference between the government and member states.85

Universal suffrage is an aspiration with broad-based public support in Somalia, especially amongst the country’s huge constituency of young people.

Besides these changes, an electoral framework should build on direct elections at the district level to include a roadmap outlining how Somalia can reach universal suffrage over the next electoral cycles, along with benchmarks it should meet to demonstrate progress. Universal suffrage is an aspiration with broad-based public support in Somalia, especially amongst the country’s huge constituency of young people, but political disputes have continuously stalled it. A roadmap does not need to be a detailed document, but it should lay out what electoral designs Somalia would use for forthcoming elections, alongside a realistic assessment of the steps and time required to achieve a popular vote. Successive Somali administrations have attempted to move from narrow indirect selections to widespread universal suffrage in just a few years, but consistently failed to do so. A more methodological approach that makes gradual progress would likely yield better results.

A roadmap would have the additional advantage of locking in Somalia’s political elite by setting rules for the next electoral cycles in advance to avoid constant debate and political dispute over what model should be used in the absence of universal suffrage. This approach would help Somalia make progress toward its democratic goals while avoiding debilitating bouts of unrest at every stride.

VII.Conclusion

Elections have been a persistent source of tension in Somalia, and the country is on track for another outbreak of electoral turmoil unless a compromise on the voting system can be reached. The risk is not only a recurrence of violence but also worsening political fragmentation as well as lasting damage to the Somali federal system. The only way to avoid this is to develop an inclusive electoral roadmap – ideally one that remains in place beyond the current polls, and maps a route to universal suffrage that all sides can agree upon. In the meantime, Somalia could take a stride toward that goal by pressing ahead with plans to hold direct elections at the district level.

A great spirit of political compromise will be required from the government and those political rivals of the president and leaders of states that oppose the current electoral reforms. An electoral deal will benefit all sides. It can help the government patch up its ties with members states and political adversaries, enable the opposition to stop the government extending its mandate, and curb the threat of violence. Reaching agreements on electoral reforms sooner rather than later will also ensure there is more time to increase the number of Somali voters who participate, introduce firebreaks that reduce the leeway for manipulation and corruption in the polls, and build public consensus around change. While there are signs that the positions of some political figures are softening, much remains to be done. To ward off the risk of unrest and stop any further erosion of the credibility of Somalia’s federal state, compromise will be vital.

Nairobi/Brussels, 24 September 2025

International Crisis Group