By Daniel N. Rosenblum,Marsha McGraw Olive,Marsha McGraw Olive and Daniel N. Rosenblum

Copyright thediplomat

An opportunity for transformative diplomacy is flying under the radar in Central Eurasia – the Caucasus and Central Asia. While the rest of the world is fracturing, the eight countries of Central Eurasia are integrating along an east-west trade route, spurring a surge of both foreign attention and foreign investment. U.S President Donald Trump could engineer a geopolitical policy shift and strengthen U.S. national interests by delivering a one-two diplomatic punch in this resource-rich, EU-sized territory where Russia and China both assert dominance. The first “punch” has already been thrown: the White House-assisted peace framework between Armenia and Azerbaijan represents a significant breakthrough. By putting the U.S. in charge of a new Eurasian land route, the so-called Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) between Azerbaijan and Turkiye through Armenian territory, Azerbaijan and Armenia gave the U.S. leverage in the Caucasus at the expense of Iran and Russia. If accompanied by sustained leadership, TRIPP could enable the U.S. to be a driver of investments and transport policies along the entire “Middle Corridor,” from the Chinese border to the Black Sea. Without an exit through the Caucasus, critical minerals, oil and gas, and other commodities from land-locked Central Asia can only reach Europe and the United States through Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iran. Connectivity through the Caucasus is essential for the regional economy. To cement these benefits and maximize U.S. leverage, the Trump administration should now deliver a second diplomatic “punch,” this time landing in Central Asia. Since then-Secretary of State James Baker made the first official U.S. visit to Central Asia in 1992, leading to the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, U.S. engagement with Central Asia has been consistent but modest. In 2015, the Obama administration convened the first “Central Asia plus U.S.” (“C5+1”) diplomatic meeting, resulting in greater regional dialogue with the United States on areas of shared interest, such as security, trade routes, energy, and critical minerals. Geopolitical competition in Central Asia is now ramping up around these same issues. Based on its strategic investments in transport infrastructure, critical minerals, crypto mining, energy, and surveillance technology, China is now positioned to exert economic coercion, especially in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Russia retains substantial leverage and can play the spoiler, due to military and intelligence ties, its role as a market for excess Central Asian labor, and essential energy supplies. Russia and China would like to exclude the United States and Europe from Central Eurasia altogether. But the region actively seeks Western investment and involvement. Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed U.S. interest in accessing critical minerals in Uzbekistan in a call with his Uzbek counterpart earlier this year, but as of this date, has not done the same for Kazakhstan, which aims to become a rare earth processing hub. A critical question is whether the U.S. can compete with China for upstream extraction or midstream processing deals in this strategic region. To strengthen national interests and make the U.S. a serious regional competitor, Trump should become the first U.S. president to visit the region and celebrate the 10th anniversary of the C5+1 in a summit with the five Central Asian presidents. To make the impact truly seismic, he could invite the heads of state of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia to attend, and deliver a brand-new long-term investment strategy aimed at deepening U.S. engagement on critical minerals in this region. Such a strategy would be a natural complement to the president’s March executive order on the United States’ critical minerals emergency. Unlike deals struck during his state visit to Saudi Arabia or the “security-for-minerals” framework with Ukraine, this strategy would align private and public financing around a single strategic objective: ramping up critical mineral processing outside of China. That goal requires unparalleled coordination among mineral suppliers and consumers, equivalent to a “moonshot,” to overcome financing gaps and constraints along the value chain from exploration to manufacturing. Central Eurasia could be the first proof-of-concept. At the summit, Trump and regional partners could adopt a framework to accelerate cross-border and country investments in the critical minerals supply chain, particularly rare earth elements, which are abundant in the region. These would be tied to market-based and secure offtake rights grounded in updated and transparent geological surveys. Follow-on deals pursuant to the framework would be negotiated with each country. The framework would be augmented by development of secure transport options for shipment of sensitive commodities, such as uranium, and financing of “no-regrets” infrastructure projects and actions aimed at maximizing the efficiency and lowering the cost of Middle Corridor trade routes to the West, including the design and construction of TRIPP. Trade route improvement projects should include both hard and soft infrastructure, such as electronic customs systems to trace and facilitate the movement of goods. To unlock sizable long-term capital investments, the U.S. could designate the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which is reportedly considering a $5 billion fund for critical mineral investments, as the lead agency for this effort. The DFC could spearhead a consortium of private investors in coordination with multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, the IFC and the EBRD. Importantly, these institutions bring international standards that protect people and the environment and reduce the risk of corruption and unsustainable debt burdens – all problems associated with past Chinese investments. Meanwhile, financing by EXIM Bank for imports of critical mineral supplies for American industries, and export credit lines or loan guarantees to American companies for construction, railway rolling stock, or ICT systems in regional projects would bring jobs to U.S. workers and a greater U.S. private sector presence. Assurance against political risks such as expropriation or ex-post claims could be provided by the DFC or the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Diversifying critical mineral supply chains from Central Asia requires long-term political and economic stability and favorable business conditions in host countries, including competitive and transparent bidding. Central Asian governments are improving investment legislation and could close loopholes with U.S. assistance. Investor interest will also rise if governments enforce legal and regulatory commitments and follow through on plans to privatize state-owned assets. There will be no security for the United States and Europe if China controls critical mineral supply chains in the Eurasian supercontinent. The best policy bet is greater Western economic engagement through peaceful competition. The first step is to reimagine the United States’ place in the strategic geography of Eurasia with a U.S. presidential-led critical minerals summit, and to follow it up with concrete investments that could shape U.S. influence in the region for years to come.