By Khurram Abbas

Copyright dawn

A WEEK after the Pahalgam terror attack in May, India banned 16 mainstream Pakistani channels and imposed a selective ban on hundreds of Pakistani X handles. It also blocked dozens of Pakistani YouTube channels and newspapers. In response, Pakistan banned 16 Indian YouTube news channels, 31 YouTube links and 32 Indian news websites. While armed hostilities ceased the same month, users on both sides continue to be denied access to over 100 Pakistani and Indian media outlets.

What motivates India and Pakistan to continue blocking access to each other’s media outlets? Apparently, each government cites ‘false/anti-state propaganda’ as justification for blocking the media outlets of the other side. However, the underlying reasons seem to be far more complex. There are several factors that contribute to the initiation and prolonging of such actions by both states.

First, the two South Asian states are experiencing a decline in democratic norms. In fact, autocratic and authoritarian tendencies are replacing democratic norms on both sides. For Pakistan, this is not new; the country has witnessed several periods of direct and indirect military interventions. According to the 2025 annual report of democracy watchdog V-Dem, Pakistan is in the process of rapidly turning into an autocratising country. But the report also categorises India as an ‘electoral autocracy’, presently with its worst score since 1947. Unlike democracies, autocratic regimes tend to discourage critical information and ideas. The lower India and Pakistan descend the democratic ladder, the tighter their grip becomes on access to critical information.

Second, the two states seem to be fundamentally insecure when it comes to differing ideas. The competing narratives of victory in the May 2025 crisis exacerbated these insecurities. Both New Delhi and Islamabad presented claims of a decisive triumph to their respective citizens. This narrative-building and perception-management exercise leaves little room for dissenting voices or alternative perspectives that might challenge the state’s version of events.

Media on both sides is amplifying state narratives.

Third, existing Pakistan-India hostilities and the absence of backchannel diplomacy are prolonging the respective bans on media outlets. In a highly hostile environment, neither Islamabad nor New Delhi seems willing to undo their decisions, which could be perceived as a weakness.

Fourth, New Delhi and Islamabad might be concerned about negative reactions of the ultra-nationalist segments of their respective societies. Instead of looking upon any potential restoration of access to news websites and media channels as a goodwill gesture, these segments might be perceiving it as ‘backstabbing’. Hence, neither Islamabad nor New Delhi wants uninvited criticism from hyper-nationalist voices.

Lastly, cutting down access to critical ideas and information is part of a broader trend of the fading ‘bilateralism’ between India and Pakistan. After denying business communities access to each other’s markets, stopping citizens from visiting each other’s cities, and withdrawing from bilateral sporting ties, the media industry, including the journalist community, has fallen prey to this broader trend of ‘fading bilateralism’.

The ban on media channels and the blocking of Indian and Pakistani news outlets has a significant sociopolitical impact.

First, in the absence of counter-information and critical narratives, perceptions on both sides are being manufactured. Res-u-ltantly, the appetite for peace and dialogue in public as well as in policymaking circles is being squeezed.

Second, the me–dia used to play a constructive role in calming India-Pak-istan hostilities. For instance, the Aman ki Asha initiative, launched by two major media groups — one in Pakistan, the other in India — had promoted media cooperation and people-to-people exchanges. This trend is now absent, because with reciprocal access denial, the majority of media houses and social media channels have resorted to a partisan and reactionary approach in reporting the conflict. YouTube channels, 24/7 media coverage, including fiery TV debates, and social media campaigns now portray restraint as ‘betrayal’ and frame ‘adversaries’ as weak. Hence, instead of being a ‘voice of peace’, mainstream as well as social media outlets on both sides are amplifying state narratives. Resultantly, the political cost of initiating a normalisation process is being pushed up.

In this environment, it is unlikely that either government will move to unblock access to the other’s news websites, social media platforms or mainstream media channels. In fact, allowing cross-border access to media channels and news sites carries greater benefits than costs. This is a low-hanging fruit, easy to pluck through backchannel diplomacy.

The writer is an analyst of South Asian affairs. The views expressed are his own.

Published in Dawn, September 18th, 2025