By Mohammad Ali Babakhel
Copyright dawn
CROSS-border terrorism (CBT) refers to terrorists crossing national boundaries to carry out attacks or using foreign territory for training, planning and launching operations. These activities are interlinked with illicit networks that finance terrorism, creating a broader ‘illegal spectrum of crime’. CBT between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been a complex issue. Historical grievances, regional instability, arrival and departure of superpowers, weak governance in Afghanistan and the presence of militant groups in border areas have complicated the scenario.
During the USSR’s military presence in Afghanistan, fighters resisting the Soviets were accorded the status of ‘mujahideen’; subsidiaries of those groups continue to operate. Militant outfits challenging peace in Pakistan were proscribed; to date, Pakistan has banned 82 organisations, many with roots across the border.
The proximity of tribal districts to Afghan provinces has heightened security challenges and harmed the peace index. Decades-long weak governance in the former Fata, hostile entities and ideological recruitment have hampered counterterrorism (CT) efforts. Despite financial constraints, Pakistan has fenced most of its border but faces persistent violations.
Withdrawal of US troops and the Afg-han Taliban’s return to power in 2021 raised hopes of reduced militancy, but in fact, the opposite occurred. CBT remains rooted in historical, geopolitical and secur-ity dynamics. The trust deficit, violent non-state actors and weak Afghan border control make the task difficult. Before the merger of Fata into KP, law enforcement was based on tribal customs and mainta-i-n-ed by Levies and Khasadars. After the merger, KP Police was tasked with transfo-r-ming these forces into a professional service, altering the dynamics of countering CBT. Weapons left behind after the US wit-hdrawal are now used by militants against LEAs, as seen in the Jaffar Express attack.
Illicit financing sustains extremism. Across the border, the opium trade, arms smuggling, informal transactions, and extortion generate funds, while cyberspace provides propaganda, recruitment and fundraising opportunities. Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan — one of the largest narco-producing countries — and Iran — a gateway to Europe — increases its vulnerability. To address these complexities and curb illegal spectrum activities, measures have been included in the National Action Plan.
Response based on security will not suffice.
Countering CBT can’t be separated from dismantling the illegal networks sustaining it. A security-based response will not suffice. A multipronged strategy is required: governance reform, regional cooperation, socioeconomic resilience and technological advancement. The situation demands tackling not only the symptoms but also the structural enablers. Improved intelligence cooperation, denial of space to militants by Afghanistan, stronger CT efforts by both sides, and international support for dialogue and development can help reduce CBT.
According to the 35th UN sanctions monitoring team report (2025), the number of militants on Afghan soil remained unchanged, with a surge in cross-border attacks. Measures such as fencing, drone surveillance, regional diplomacy, financial intelligence, anti-money laundering measures, judicial reforms, youth empowerment and rehabilitation of former militants all need greater investment.
Administrative reforms have also play–ed a role. Before the 25th Constitutional Amendment, the then Fata was administered federally. Now, through consti-tutional and administrative measures, provincial governa-nce has been exten-ded. Merger of the former tribal areas and the division of Chitral and South Waziristan into two districts each are steps to improve governance. Twelve joint check-po-sts have been establi-shed in KP to enhance collaboration between the federal and provincial LEAs. Profiling non-customs paid vehicles and linking data with CNICs and biometric systems will help track suspicious activity.
Globally, best practices include agreements, intelligence-sharing, joint operations and extraditions. Integrated border management, surveillance through dron-es and biometrics, CCTV networks and mot-ion sensors are widely used. Prevention of radicalisation through community engagement, education and local partnerships has proved effective. To effectively counter CBT, there is no single perfect solution, but rather a combination of technology, policy, cooperation and diplomacy, including fencing, intelligence-sharing, and glob–al and regional institutional cooperation.
Border security is a shared responsibility. Instability on one side inevitably affects the other. Only enhanced bilateral engagement and intelligence cooperation can help maintain peace.
The writer is the author of Pakistan: In Between Extremism and Peace.
alibabakhel@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2025
