By News desk

Copyright pakobserver

THE twenty-first century has been dubbed Asia’s century.

Yet, if Asia is rising, its history would be incomplete without mentioning its two hostile and powerful nations, China and India. Geography and to some extent cultural ties bind them together, but boundaries, mistrust and conflicting aspirations for leadership keep them apart. China sees itself as destined to become a “Middle Kingdom” civilization. India, on the other hand, is steadfast in its post-colonial pursuit of strategic independence. What results from the collision of these narratives is a partnership that is perpetually on the verge of conflict and cooperation. Any defeat turns into a political wound, while even small tactical victories along the Line of Actual Control are exaggerated into emblems of national pride. Because nationalism is a constant diet for both publics, compromise seems perilously near to treachery.

Nowadays, a large portion of the rivalry takes place outside of the mountains. From Gwadar to Hambantota, Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative is seen in New Delhi as a “string of pearls” that will tighten the noose and encircle India in its own nautical backyard. As a result, India has become more transparent in forming alliances with the US, Japan and Australia via the Quad framework. This appears to be encirclement to Beijing, but it is just balancing to New Delhi. In their own unique ways, both readings are accurate.

It would be incorrect to infer, however, that Beijing views New Delhi as its main strategic challenge. China has its sights set on the South China Sea, Taiwan and the United States. But the uncooperative neighbor who defies convention is India, a regional adversary whose ascent makes Beijing’s attempt to dominate the region more difficult. Chinese strategists are concerned by India’s democratic model as well as its military prowess because they believe it provides a more Western-friendly ideological alternative.

The division is widened by domestic politics on both sides. The China card and border tensions have been exploited by Modi’s government to strengthen political legitimacy domestically and energize nationalist sentiment. Nevertheless, the world is not destined to witness a Sino-Indian conflict in spite of these circumstances. Important pressure valves are provided by nuclear deterrence, economic interdependence and multilateral platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. These systems keep competition from degenerating into disaster, but they don’t settle arguments. The two sides can learn to be cautious neighbors by competing, balancing and sometimes working together, but they may never regain the friendly camaraderie of the 1950s.

This dynamic is further complicated by India’s emergence as a possible Western technological hub. Its increasing involvement in international supply chains, semiconductor investments and AI partnerships put China’s ambitions for digital hegemony in jeopardy. China’s delicate maritime lanes are in danger due to India’s naval buildup in the Indo-Pacific, especially from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. New Delhi’s growing naval confidence is reinforcing Beijing’s “Malacca Dilemma” – the dread of energy chokepoints controlled by foreigners.

Therefore, the struggle is not just about borders and mountains but also about supply chains, sea lanes and cyber networks. It is a battle waged in silence in ports, trade routes and online forums. Often written off as “debt-trap diplomacy,” China’s economic policy aims to entice its weaker neighbors into its orbit. As counterweights, India’s “Neighborhood First” and “Act East” programs use diplomacy, economic and cultural links to counterbalance Beijing’s influence.

Fundamentally, the relationship between China and India exemplifies the traditional “security dilemma.” Whether through strategic alliances, infrastructure initiatives, or military buildups, each side’s attempt to improve its own security is seen as a threat by the other. However, unlike the Cold War, this competition does not always portend impending war. The costs of escalation are known to both parties. Guardrails include economic integration, nuclear deterrence and simple demographic constraints.

The two neighbours are currently ensnared in a complex embrace because they are too strong to ignore, too distrustful to fully collaborate and too dependent on one another to run the risk of full-scale war. In many respects, Asia’s century will be their century. Whether they decide to portray it as one of paranoia or wealth is the question.

—The writer is currently working as an Assistant Professor at Institute of Business Management (IoBM).

(muhammad.mustafa@iobm.edu.pk)